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LETTERS

cable TV

Toledo, Ohio

Dear Sirs: Ralph Lee Smith's "The Wired Nation" [*The Nation,* May 18] is, by far, the best work which has yet appeared on cable television. You have performed a real service in publishing this item. It will benefit everyone who is connected with this new service.

Mr. Smith did not fully cover the subject of the continuing gray area of jurisdiction over cable television. While there has been a mad rush for franchises, there has never been a clear definition of why franchises were required. . . .

It might interest you to know of one decision which has been rendered quite recently that holds that the cities and local authorities do not have the right to tax or regulate cable television. . . . The action was brought by one of the subsidiaries of Lamb Communications, Inc., Wonderland Ventures, Inc., against the cities of Sandusky and Fremont, Ohio, and the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was rendered on March 26. You will be hearing a great deal more of this decision. *Edward Lamb*

Coatesville, Pa.

Dear Sirs: Let me congratulate you on the first-rate coverage of a complex, sensitive subject. I take my hat off to Mr. Smith. . . .

I feel, however, that he did not give complete coverage to the subject of broadcasters being required to furnish free time to political candidates. No one seems to be suggesting that newspapers (or *The Nation*) be required to furnish considerable free space for advertisements for political candidates, and no one seems to be suggesting that the billboard companies furnish many free billboards to political candidates. I fail to see why this legal requirement for broadcasters would be any less an expropriation than the aforementioned demand of all the other media. . . . Overall, however, my comment is "Bravo!" *Louis N. Seltzer, president*
Cable TV of Chester County

New York City

Dear Sirs: Mr. Lamb is right that I did not give full coverage to the many issues involved in municipal franchising of cable systems. This was a conscious choice and a painful necessity imposed by limitations of space. The cable franchising activities of U.S. cities are a legal, social and civic disgrace in their extensive failure to promote the public interest. I hope to do an article on this subject in the near future, and in the interim I thank Mr. Lamb for bringing the issue to the attention of *Nation* readers.

As for Mr. Seltzer's comments on free time for political candidates in media other than broadcasting, I definitely believe that he is right. My article, of course, was specifically directed to the impact of cable systems on this crucial issue. *Ralph Lee Smith*

long time dying

Los Angeles, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: This is about the fourth California Democratic Council funeral I have attended in seventeen years. ["California's Club Movement: The Palsy of the CDC" by Francis M. Carney, *The Nation,* May 4.] After the last dirge we started the movement that yanked Johnson from the White House. After this one we'll have George Brown in the Senate. Professor Carney would do well to shift his gaze from quantity to quality. He didn't say a word about most CDC headquarters being run twenty-four hours a day by oldies under 30. *David Seidman*

EDITORIALS

The Power of the Purse

Operation Pursestrings is the lobbying effort for the Amendment To End the War, sponsored by McGovern, Hatfield, Hughes, Goodell and Cranston. It makes excellent political sense and should be pushed with all possible vigor. The lobbying effort is needed to get a record vote as a basis for the second step—action in the Congressional elections in November.

The name, Operation Pursestrings, emphasizes the crucial underlying issues. Under some circumstances, talk may be a form of action. In Congress the two are far from synonymous. It is possible for a Representative or a Senator to make a speech attacking the war in Vietnam and then to cast an unrecorded vote for the military budget with which that war is carried on, and future wars are prepared. It must be recognized that a large part of the trouble in which we find ourselves stems from the practice of, year after year, appropriating huge military budgets without debate and, above all, without imposing sensible checks on their uses—and to do this by rote, without ever reconsidering the overblown foreign policy objectives of the cold war.

For twenty-five years, Congress has passed every military budget request, often after discussion so brief as to be derisory. On occasion, it has given the Pentagon more than the particular administration in power had requested. In this wise we built up a formidable war machine, a juggernaut with its own dynamics. As Harrison Brown points out in a recent *New York Times* review of Seymour Melman's *Pentagon Capitalism,* "The Department of Defense has become de facto the primary executive body of the federal government. It comes close to being the primary legislative body as well."

This was made possible by the abnegation by Congress of its constitutional power and duty. Congress now shows signs of examining its conscience in this respect, although those members who are calling it to account are the ones who have been trying to force such a revaluation for years past. Last April, when the military budget came before the House, Rep. Paul Findley (R., Ill.) raised with his colleagues the question of the circumstances under which these forces might be used and the place or places at which decisions would be made. Mr. Findley said: "Mr. Chairman, we have a grave responsibility under the Constitution that I am afraid we do not very often reflect upon. It is not only the responsibility to raise armies and provide a navy as set forth in Article I, but also to provide for the regulation thereof. We can properly ask ourselves, what provisions have we made for the regulation of the tremendous military potential that is to be authorized by this bill?"

The answer is, virtually none, and that failure brings the issue to the fore. For two decades or more Congress has never failed to fund a major weapons system. To this day Congress can muster only a handful of votes against a military budget amounting to $70 billion or $80 billion. Under these conditions, program determines policy.

The Amendment to End the War seeks to end the intolerable conflict now dividing the country and disgracing

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it before the world. Passing an amendment to curb the war-making powers of the President is highly desirable, but it does not in itself solve the problem. The military can hold a weak or compliant President captive to their plans and operations. The proposed amendment would be a political rebuke to the President which he well deserves, since first he took his time in dealing with the war and then, via Cambodia, he is enlarging it. But it is not these actions, nor this President, that is at issue. The necessity is to curb the gargantuan war machine itself, that colossus which by its own momentum, the vested interests allied with it, and the acquiescence of Congress, will otherwise continue to carry the country toward destruction.

The Big Boomer

The supersonic transport is holding out the tin cup again: $290 million, please. The Administration's review of the SST last September should have resulted in a termination of the project, but the report was turned upside down and Congress appropriated funds necessary to continue the program. Now the 1971 appropriation, having been narrowly passed by the House of Representatives, goes to the Senate. The issue therefore is not yet resolved. The $290 million is the largest request so far.

In hearings before a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, Russell E. Train, chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, said the SST could affect the balance of heat in the atmosphere, leading to a higher average surface temperature. He also raised the possibility that it could destroy ozone at its cruising altitude of 60,000 to 70,000 feet. Ozone shields the earth from potentially "highly dangerous" ultraviolet radiation. As for noise, Judge Train estimated that the SST would be three or four times louder than present airport noise standards permit, and doubted that with foreseeable technology the noise level could be lowered. In the wake of this damaging testimony, Judge Train repeated the Administration's argument that the current program was for prototype development only and commercial development would not be undertaken until the environmental problems were satisfactorily resolved. Judge Train refused to give his personal opinion on whether Congress should appropriate the funds, saying he was testifying as a representative of the Administration.

At these same hearings, Under Secretary of the Department of Transportation James M. Beggs, after repeating the familiar arguments for the project, disclosed that there had been a $76 million cost overrun and made it clear that there can be no guarantee that future cost overruns would not occur. The most candid and relevant testimony came from Elwood Quesada, a former Air Force general and a first-rate flier in his time, a former FAA administrator, and currently a board member of American Airlines. "The feeling among airline executives," he said, "is to wish that the SST would go away." The air transport industry is not ready economically for a supersonic aircraft, nor does such a plane meet a genuine market demand.

These statements bring us to the crux of the matter. In the past, the government has financed research and de-

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velopment costs of military aircraft, making it possible for airplane manufacturers to adapt these designs, in some cases, for civilian use. The SST is being promoted on a different basis. The cost of developing its two prototypes is to be divided in the ratio of $1.3 billion from the federal government; $285 million from Boeing, the prime contractor, and General Electric, which is developing the engines; and $60 million from the airlines. No one can foretell the ultimate cost of the venture, except that it will be higher than the highest estimate—it always is. Add to this the fact that the size of a commerical market cannot be estimated, and that the government would not get back its investment until some 300 SSTs were sold, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this is a bad deal for the government and the taxpayer. The SST is a strictly commercial venture. Why then should the government assume a major share of the risk with no expectation of sharing in the profits? This is not a "partnership"; it is a gift of government credit for a purely private venture.

Machiavelli?

A central aspect of the President's "credibility" problem, which is engaging the attention of a wide section of the press, is the seemingly theoretical question: Is he or is he not Machiavelli in a business suit? If he is, and assuming further that he is master of the role, we could interpret his actions with some degree of plausibility. If he is merely a bungler or, equally ominous, an incompetent Machiavelli, he and the country are in more trouble than the stoutest hearts among the commentators have so far dared to face.

Perhaps Stewart Alsop, who has the inside track with Mr. Nixon, can help toward a decision on this vital point. Mr. Alsop has had access to the large sheets of yellow paper on which the President communes with himself when pondering his next moves in the perilous affairs of state. Before deciding to devastate Cambodia on the pattern of South Vietnam and Laos, the President listed the pluses and minuses—from an American standpoint, as interpreted by him—and either showed the paper to his confidant or, much less likely, the latter photographed it with a spy camera disguised as a tie clip. Either way, we are informed in Alsop's *Newsweek* column (June 1) that this "historical document . . . gives a fascinating insight both into the thought processes of the President and into the dilemmas that confront any man who must make the final decisions at a time of terrible dissension at home and ultimate peril abroad."

What is really fascinating about this document is that Mr. Nixon apparently did not list, as a plus or a minus, the ancient and bitter enmity between Cambodians and Vietnamese, which has resulted in the former wishing for American protection from the latter. If he failed to spot that in his quest for dilemmas, the President is not qualified to play at Machiavelli with experts.

Mr. Alsop, however, is not in the least doubt that his protégé, so to speak, is a master of statesmanlike deception. In his column of the previous week he said flatly that Mr. Nixon is conducting the greatest retreat in American history. In this view, the Cambodian operation is designed to reduce the risks of withdrawal and camouflage an American defeat, or at any rate something closer to defeat than to victory.

The unanswered questions left by Mr. Alsop's speculations can perhaps be resolved by comparing the President's machinations so far with those of a genuine master —General Charles de Gaulle. In many respects getting out of Algeria was a more ticklish business than getting out of Vietnam. To do it, de Gaulle lied like a *sans-culotte,* threw out all kinds of cover stories, double-crossed his own generals, misled and expropriated the *colons,* and finally quelled the generals' rebellion with measures as harsh as had ever been employed in the disciplining of the French army. But, after all the talk about a "peace of the brave" and suchlike embroidery, he got out.

He did, it is to be noted, concede the main point at issue: the independence of Algeria. Not only that, but the manner of his withdrawal made France look well in the perspective of history, despite all the horrors of a savage civil war. De Gaulle saved a military base for France, at least for a while, and preserved some important economic ties. But then, de Gaulle had the advantage over Nixon of being a great man with a world-wide reputation and an illustrious record as a prophet, a resistance leader and a patriot. To accomplish the ends consistent with his objective, he availed himself of the entire repertory of Machiavellian deceptions and stratagems, never losing sight of the essential concession which, early in the conflict, he realized he had to make in his country's interest.

It is possible that Mr. Nixon would like to be a Machiavelli. He may even think he is one, but the evidence to support that view of him is extremely equivocal. The Cambodian incursion makes it the more doubtful. Norman Mailer is probably much nearer the truth in this connection than Stewart Alsop. He seems to have Nixon's Machiavellianism shrewdly assessed when he says, "Weak men always make military moves which are too strong. . . .They overcompensate out of fear that if history finds them weak, history will be right." The bombastic TV speech in which Mr. Nixon announced his decision practically says the same thing by indirection.

Access to the Media

The Democratic National Committe has filed a petition with the FCC to secure a declaratory ruling that broadcasters may not, as a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such as the D.N.C., for discussions of public issues which also contain an appeal for funds. CBS had previously refused to sell the D.N.C. time for a documentary of this sort, but the issue has a broader reference: four anti-war and anti-draft groups have complaints pending with the FCC over the failure of broadcasters either to give or sell them time to present their views.

The D.N.C. petition raises a number of critically important issues. One is the right of access to the media by the opposition party, for the purpose of answering the President when he uses free network time for speeches which are really political. Since April 20 the President has appeared three times on all three networks to justify his policies in Indo-China. Yet when the D.N.C. requested the three networks to carry Lawrence O'Brien's speech in Milwaukee, which was the formal Democratic response

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to what the President had said, only ABC complied. And recently Senator McGovern and four of his colleagues had to purchase time on NBC (May 12), at a cost of $75,000, for a discussion of their proposal to curb the President's power to wage undeclared war in Southeast Asia. In a brief filed by a group of Yale Law School professors in support of the D.N.C.'s petition, it is said that this is "as if the President had a megaphone and soapbox while everyone else is required to whisper." Vietnam is the major controversial issue in this year's Congressional elections; it is absurd to contend that what the President has to say in defense of his policies there, or by way of justifying his economic policies, is nonpolitical.

In addition, the networks have an obligation, under the fairness doctrine, to provide more free time for general discussion of the issues which everyone agrees sharply divide the nation. If this division is not to deepen, meaningful dialogue is imperative. Finally there is the right to buy time for political programs which include an appeal for funds along with a discussion of important controversal issues. The program for which Senator McGovern and his colleagues purchased time on NBC may bring in more than $300,000—an indication of how effective such appeals can be and how they can stimulate citizen participation in the political process. The Democrats have a huge indebtedness from the 1968 campaign—around $8 million—and they must reach large numbers of small contributors if this debt is to be paid and if they are to conduct an effective campaign in this year's Congressional elections. FCC Chairman Dean Burch knows how effective such appeals can be. As chairman of the Republican National Committee he made such an appeal on October 19, 1964, and tapped what one party official termed "the most phenomenal outpouring of campaign funds in the history of this country." The FCC should act promptly and favorably on the D.N.C.'s petition.

Feather Merchants

It has been quietly revealed in Washington that the Defense Department is stockpiling 3 million pounds of feathers, as part of the strategic materials program to avoid shortages in the event of war.

The stash of feathers, so vital to our national defense, is valued conservatively at $12 million, but the Administration, despite pressures to balance the budget, has put an end to the reduction of the stockpile which began four years ago under Mr. Johnson. At that time some officials called the mountainous accumulation of feathers ridiculous.

The latest report on the feather situation was made by Sen. Stephen M. Young (D., Ohio), who revealed that "20,000 bags of feathers—mostly goose feathers—are bagged in 50-pound bags in defense depots and warehouses in hush-hush secret locations in various parts of the country, along with 100,000 bags of down." Senator Young observed: "It is noteworthy that though $3 billion of tin and other material stockpiled was sold on the open market, the cost of tin, rubber and other stockpiled materials has risen despite the clamor on the part of some that throwing stockpiled materials on the market would unsettle it and cause huge losses."

Elaborating on the logistics of feather security, a Pentagon official said in a serious statement recently published in Washington: "It is important that they [the feather bags] be spread out to different warehouses. After all if the Chinese suddenly drop a bomb, we might lose all our feathers at once."

So far President Nixon has done nothing to reduce the national stockpile of feathers, or other stockpiled items for that matter, stored in warehouses throughout the nation and costing the taxpayer more than $17 billion. The storage charges alone run to about $14 million a year.

The schemes of the Pentagon are long, deep and devious, and as to feathers a layman can only speculate. Icarus comes to mind, as does the aboriginal shaman. Feathers cause allergies, and induce severe retching when applied to the soft palate (international strictures on chemical warfare do not ban feathers). Normally, we do not ask to sit in on the games the War College plays, but feathers tickle our curiosity, and since the public has been made to buy $12 million worth of them, we make bold to ask that the military raise at least a small corner of this gossamer curtain.

Joseph Wood Krutch (1893-1970)

The life of Joseph Wood Krutch came full circle with a significance not granted to many men. In his student years, he was at first a scientist, but even then, some fifty years ago, Mr. Krutch became fearful of the effect that science, unchecked by the values of a humane philosophy, was having on modern life. So, having majored in mathematics at the University of Tennessee, he turned to the humanities and earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. at Columbia University in that area. From 1924 to 1951 he was theatre critic of *The Nation,* and in 1943 became Brander Matthews Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia. He published books on Edgar Allan Poe, Samuel Johnson and the modern theatre; he edited an edition of Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past.*

Then in 1948 Mr. Krutch published a biography of Thoreau, and at about that time a respiratory ailment prompted him to leave New York. From then on, he lived almost without interruption in the American deserts, becoming a naturalist of renown and writing an unremitting stream of books to make vivid the generosity of nature and to protest against modern man's heedless abuse of it. Mr. Krutch understood pollution when the youth of New York could still swim in the Hudson River; he was denouncing the lethal insensitivity of technology when conservation was still dismissed as the hobby of the wealthy and the crotchet of hermits. For decades he was a prophet without honor, and the country paid the price; but when he died, conservation had become an outmoded word, ecology was the dominant domestic issue of the day, and from his books its spokesmen drew both facts and determination. Joseph Wood Krutch lived to be 76. The memory of him as a man will be cherished by his near contemporaries, but his force as a champion of life will call forth the strongest response from a generation that had not even been born when he first moved into his house in the desert beyond Tucson.

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CAMBODIA: RUNAWAY *COUP D'ETAT*

MILTON OSBORNE
Mr. Osborne, an associate professor of history at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, is the author of The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia *(Cornell University Press). He served in the Australian embassy at Phnom Penh between 1959 and 1961, and last visited Cambodia in February 1970.*

Melbourne

One of the few certainties that may be recorded about contemporary Cambodia is that in deposing Prince Norodom Sihanouk the leaders of the March 18 coup have temporarily, at least, opened a frighteningly large Pandora's box. The commitment of U.S. troops to Cambodian territory, together with South Vietnamese units which seem likely to remain longer than the deadline set by Mr. Nixon, has brought death and destruction to the countryside in the eastern border regions. The intentions of the Vietnamese Communist troops in Cambodia remain unclear, but they are undoubtedly able to harass the poorly trained and equipped Cambodian army. Meanwhile, Cambodian left-wing forces are organizing to capitalize on the situation and so to pose a further threat to General Lon Nol's government.

The background factors which contributed to Sihanouk's deposition have been present for several years. They went unrecognized, however, by a great many commentators on Cambodia because of the emotional and political appeal which Prince Sihanouk's policies had for observers disenchanted with the authoritarian regimes of the Right and the Left which govern so many Southeast Asian states. Prince Sihanouk's dazzling personality and his apparent success in both the international and domestic spheres obscured the extent to which the Phnom Penh elite, his most important supporters, were becoming more and more estranged from their leader's policies.

The best-known popular image of Sihanouk was that contained in the photographs which showed him surrounded by Cambodian peasants—receiving the homage of those who still thought of him as King, but encouraging them to join him in transforming Cambodia into a modern state. To a degree the iconography of these photographs was valid. The Prince was held in awe by the peasantry, and on his provincial tours he constantly urged upon them the value of modern agriculture and education. But as with any icon, the photographs could show only one aspect of Cambodian life.

The devotion which the Cambodian peasants gave to Sihanouk was essentially passive. In terms of real power his continuing leadership of the country depended on the support of an elite, based chiefly in Phnom Penh, which had its hands on the administration and the armed forces. These were the men, symbolized so accurately by the new triumvirate of General Lon Nol, Prince Sirik Matak and Yem Sambaur, who came to believe that Sihanouk's policies were leading Cambodia toward disaster.

Underlying discontent with Sihanouk's economic policies was apparent in Phnom Penh by 1966. The various economic decisions, which had led to the cancellation of American aid, the nationalization of all major commercial activity and the pursuit of austerity policies, brought slow but steady economic stagnation to Cambodia. This stagnation also limited the opportunities of the upper class to supplement its income in the manner to which it had grown accustomed during the halcyon days of American aid and essentially unrestricted commercial activity. Sihanouk, who had taken his economic decisions against the advice of his principal economic expert, had believed that the new measures would curb the commercial power of foreigners within Cambodia. He failed to see that in pursuing this goal he would also restrict the incomes of a wide range of Cambodians in his administration.

Sihanouk also seems to have overlooked the effect of his economic decisions on the army. The Cambodian army by the late sixties was generally ill-equipped and undertrained. It faced major problems because of a weapons inventory culled from several sources. On occasion it was unable to respond to border incursions in more distant regions of Cambodia because it lacked gasoline. Frequently pro-Western in political attitudes, the officer corps found many grounds to resent its situation, but the loyalty of its leaders to Sihanouk, not least the loyalty of General Lon Nol, prevented the army from assuming a political role.

While the economic decline of Cambodia was a pervasive force, other, more personal factors contributed to undermining Sihanouk's authority. During 1968 his consort, Madame Monique, a woman of Italian and Cambodian ancestry, emerged as a person with fixed goals of personal enrichment and political power. Always regarded with some suspicion by influential Cambodians because of her mixed ancestry, Monique's conspicuous pursuit of wealth at a level which surpassed even the normally tolerant standards of the country earned her bitter resentment. It was made sharper by the feeling that she was using her position as the Prince's consort to further the career of her favorites, including her half brother, Colonel Oum Mannorine. It was not that Sihanouk, himself, was associated by the elite with Monique's corrupt activities but rather that his failure to curb her became yet another reason to consider the need for change.

The other notable personal element in the catalogue of major background factors leading to the *coup d'état* is less precisely definable. It involved the belief in Cambodian governing circles that Sihanouk was no longer dedicated to the hard work of statecraft. This may be surprising, for the Prince presented a public image of being constantly involved in the affairs of Cambodia. The truth was, however, that during the second half of the sixties he showed an increasing disinclination to go beyond the forms of public responsibility. Sihanouk's absorption with film making was seen as one reflection of his frivolous approach to government. His unreadiness to contemplate the dangerous consequences of an overrapid expansion of educational opportunities at the secondary and tertiary levels, which had produced a new class of underemployed "intellectuals," was for his critics further proof of his careless attitude toward serious social and political questions.

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But none of the background factors listed so far had the catalytic force required to bring the elite to the point of confronting Sihanouk and ultimately to overthrowing him. The necessary ingredient was the presence on Cambodian territory of more than 50,000 Vietnamese Communist troops. The degree to which their presence was sanctioned by Sihanouk is the subject of allegation and counter allegation. To some extent he appears to have been a victim of his earlier decisions to permit limited numbers of North Vietnamese and NLF troops to use Cambodian territory—decisions which failed to anticipate how the numbers would increase.

The point had been reached by February of this year where large sections of eastern Cambodia were regarded as having passed out of the Phnom Penh government's jurisdiction. Areas in eastern Cambodia where I had traveled freely less than four years before were now held to be dangerous as the result of Vietnamese Communist control. Sihanouk was blamed and, in a manner which contrasted sharply with the reluctance of Cambodians to speak ill of their leader in earlier years, I found responsible citizens ready in private conversation during February to speak of the Prince as a "dictator" and to damn him for bringing the country to a pass which they claimed was more lamentable than any it had ever known.

In this atmosphere of growing criticism personally directed against Sihanouk the leaders of the new regime planned their strategy of confrontation. While it is abundantly clear that Sirik Matak realized the necessity for support from the armed forces before he mounted a challenge, the point at which he was able to gain Lon Nol's



Picha, The Special (Brussels)

participation is still uncertain. Also unclear is the length to which the plotters expected to go. In all probability, a showdown, but not deposition, was the original aim of those now in charge of Cambodia's destiny.

The uncertainties involved in discussing the way in which the new leadership prepared its plans pale before the difficulty one faces in attempting to analyze the new regime's own assessment of the likely consequences of the *coup d'état*. A commitment to overthrow Sihanouk was, without making the decision appear other then grave, a matter of internal policy. Much more grave, however, was the decision of external policy that involved the demand by the new Lon Nol government for the departure of all Vietnamese Communist forces from Cambodia.

Once the new leaders had steeled themselves to overthrow the Prince, their immediate and most pressing preoccupation was the need for a policy initiative which would have some effect upon the almost unrestricted use of sections of Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese Communists. But did the new regime suppose that moral suasion would be a weapon to persuade the North Vietnamese and Liberation Front troops to leave? For, considering Cambodian military capabilities, moral suasion was all that was at the new leaders' disposal. The few well-equipped and well-trained Cambodian army units which existed at the time of the *coup d'état* were already overextended in operations in northeastern provinces.

Either one accepts that the new regime engaged in a major act of diplomatic and strategic folly in believing that the Vietnamese Communists would go when asked, or one searches for a more plausible explanation. Whatever reservations may be held concerning Lon Nol's political acumen, Sirik Matak and Yem Sambaur have, in the past, given considerable evidence of sophistication in this area. Thus a much more likely explanation of the new regime's aims would start from the assumption that its leaders were prepared to come to a compromise arrangement with the Vietnamese Communists, but wished to give the public impression of having solved the country's most immediate problem. In the very nature of things, it is impossible to prove that such were the intentions of Lon Nol and his associates. But the explanation does have the appeal of logic and it accords well with the balance of forces in Cambodia before the Nixon decision to commit American troops across Cambodia's borders.

If the new regime had been able to conclude an agreement which permitted Vietnamese Communist troops to continue major use of Cambodian sanctuaries, but under strict Cambodian control, the understanding could have been presented as a triumph, not as a compromise. The claim would have been made that the Communist troops had gone and, given the fact that many of the regions in which they have sought sanctuary are sparsely populated, the claim might have been widely accepted.

An even more devious explanation is that the call for the departure of the Vietnamese Communist troops was made in the knowledge that it would fail and so provide the new regime with a justification for arranging the entry of American and South Vietnamese troops.

There is a certain logic to this argument also, but the most telling point against it lies in the extent to which the

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new leaders were aware of the implications of extending the Vietnamese War, with its attendant death and destruction, into Cambodia. If one is to accept this explanation, one must accept that the Lon Nol government was ready to sacrifice peace in return for operations against the Vietnamese Communist troops in the country, with results that would be unpredictable in the extreme. For it is not merely that search and destroy operations are notoriously imprecise in their results; equally uncertain was the response which the Communist troops would make to a drive on their positions by the Americans and South Vietnamese. The option open to the Communist troops of attacking Cambodian towns and cities cannot have been overlooked by the new regime.

On almost every front, however, events have overtaken whatever planning the new leaders may have done. The decision to rally national support by focusing corporate hatred upon the Vietnamese residents of Cambodia became an opportunity for ethnically motivated bloodletting as the hatred of centuries spilled over and brought the bloody massacres of Vietnamese civilians. The tactic of confrontation with the Vietnamese Communist troops failed when those troops refused to deal with a government which they saw as threatening their vital interests. Most dramatically of all, the new regime's call for military equipment from friendly powers brought instead the American decision to enter Cambodia.

It may be that Mr. Nixon's decision will achieve the two goals of discomfiting the Communist troops in Cambodia and of bolstering the new Phnom Penh regime. Yet even if these short-term goals are achieved, prospects for a return of real peace to Cambodia seem bleak. The temptation for the Vietnamese Communists to go on the offensive against Cambodian towns and cities must be seen as very real. The American troops now in Cambodia may be withdrawn by the end of June, but there is no suggestion yet as to when the South Vietnamese will go. The longer they remain, and the more closely the Cambodian army cooperates with them, the more difficult will it be for the new regime to rally opinion against Sihanouk because of his readiness to work with the hated Vietnamese.

The present Cambodian leaders must now seek to survive in a situation even more complex than that which Sihanouk faced. Cambodia was drawn into the war before, but to a considerable degree that involvement was peripheral. Whatever effect Mr. Nixon's decision to fight in Cambodia may have upon the development of American policy, it seems to have insured that a solution to Cambodia's problems now depends, more than ever before, on a settlement in the whole of the Indo-Chinese region.

Is this a situation in which the new Cambodian leaders can survive? The answer appears to be a highly qualified "Yes." Even before the Nixon decision, elements of a civil war situation were developing, with scattered groups of Sihanouk's supporters joining Vietnamese Communist troops to oppose the new regime. There is liitle likelihood that armed Cambodian opposition to the new government will decrease in the wake of the American and South Vietnamese involvement.

There are few indications yet that the turbulent events of the past two months have drawn elite support from the new leaders, but that cannot be discounted as a future possibility. Already many in Phnom Penh will be asking whether the difficulties of life under Sihanouk were harder to bear than the troubles of the current period.

The army's support is vital to the new regime. Should that disappear, or should the Communist forces in Cambodia succeed in scoring a major blow against the new regime by such a dramatic act as the capture—even temporarily—of Phnom Penh, the chance of the Lon Nol government to survive would be scant.

In choosing to overthrow Sihanouk the present leaders responded to widely felt discontent among their particular constituency of influential urban Cambodians. Because of the magnitude of the change involved in their decision and their actions, one may properly speak of the *coup détat* as ending an era in Cambodia. When acting as men of destiny, Lon Nol and his associates appear unlikely to have foreseen the extent to which Cambodia's destiny was so quickly to become tragic. □

NATIONAL HEALTH

INSURANCE IS NOT ENOUGH

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In the foreign service, a diplomat is defined as one who hastens to the aid of the victor. National health insurance will be a political issue in some of the 1970 Congressional campaigns, and will eventually become the subject of Congressional action. Already, a number of diplomats are running to its assistance—at least seven national health insurance bills are in the process of being introduced into the Congress.

National health insurance has a long history in Europe, and the evidence of its success there should be an overwhelming argument for its adoption in the United States. Just at the time of America's entry into World War I it was supported by a powerful committee of the American Medical Association, headed by President Wilson's personal physician, Dr. Alexander Lambert. That committee considered voluntary health insurance un-American, since it would not be equally available to all citizens. The postwar reaction against anything "Socialist," and the capture of the American Medical Association by conservatives and its transformation into a physicians' protective association, deprived national health insurance of AMA support. However, the American Association for Labor Legislation persisted in its belief

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and, had it not been for backroom maneuvering by influential physicians with access to President Franklin Roosevelt, the Social Security Act of 1935 might have contained such a title. Since then, the battle for national health insurance has been continued mainly by Senators Wagner and Murray and Representative Dingle, beginning with their celebrated Wagner-Murray-Dingle bill of 1939, which has been reintroduced in somewhat modified form into each Congress ever since (the most recent bill was offered by Representative Dingle's son). In 1965, a partial victory was won, after ten years of struggle, with the passage of the Medicare Act, which provides national health insurance for older people.

During the present Congress, and in addition to the Dingle bill, Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (D., Mich.) has introduced a modification strongly supported by the AFL-CIO. Senator Javits has introduced another modification, the details of which are largely the work of former Secretary Wilbur Cohen, who participated in writing the Social Security Act of 1935. Walter Reuther established a Committee of 100 for National Health Insurance more than a year ago and worked strenuously with expert committees under the leadership of I. S. Falk, who was also involved in drawing up the original Social Security Act.

All these bills have a common focus; the financing is to take place through the Social Security System. A separate health insurance trust fund will be created and it will pay for the services obtained by eligible patients. No doubt the bills will all provide for merging the insurance program for the poor—Medicaid—into the more inclusive program. Medicare may or may not be merged. The American Medical Association, frantically attempting to retain control of the expenditures to be made on behalf of physicians, has introduced legislation whereby tax credits would facilitate the purchase of voluntary health insurance. This would benefit those who are employed and can buy such insurance, while the federal government, presumably, would buy such voluntary health insurance for the poor, instead of providing a payment mechanism through the states, as in the present Medicaid setup. This proposal, if it could be put across, would be a staggering bonanza for doctors, providing an open-ended budget through the insurance premiums.

Each health insurance bill will have its own mix of Social Security tax and general tax revenues, eligibility requirements, scope of services and mechanism of reimbursement—and so there will be fierce political debate. What will not be debated, if the focus is on insurance, is whether social policy is best served by offering legislative aid to *paying* for services or by legislating the guaranteed *provision* of services.

Both trade-union-sponsored proposals—the Griffiths bill sponsored by the AFL-CIO and the Reuther bill yet to be introduced—contain language intended to stimulate a better distribution and organization of health services. Unfortunately, the wording is not sufficiently strong and direct to *insure* better distribution and more resources. Furthermore, unless there is a deeply felt public demand for basic changes in organization and direction, the really radical transformations in health services will be compromised out when these bills reach committee. As with the Medicare legislation, the vested interests will lobby and logroll to make whatever legislative action emerges concentrate on financing. The widest possible discussion is necessary to educate the American people into the need for a law that *guarantees services.*

The American medical care system is administratively, financially and morally bankrupt. It is the last stronghold of laissez-faire social policy. The bulk of physicians are in solo fee-for-service practice. Most hospitals, "voluntary" and "nonprofit," are unrelated to the ambulatory care system and the long-term care system; they are competitive and uncontrolled in their management and development. The majority of the long-term care institutions are in proprietary hands; they observe few standards and are also uncontrolled and unrelated to the rest of the medical care system. Millions of Americans are unable to obtain medical care because of poor distribution or inadequate resources; other millions get inferior, disorganized, episodic services with no emphasis on prevention or continuity. Very few if any Americans receive the medical care that this century is technologically able to provide. Costs are escalating at the rate of 12 to 15 per cent a year and the proportion of gross national income now going into health services is greater here than in any other nation in the world. The situation is dangerous to the health of the people and thoroughly unsatisfactory from any point of view.

The poor, of course, suffer the consequences of disorganization and other deficiencies in an exaggerated form. And since minority groups—blacks, Chicanos and Indians—are more likely to be poor, the health statistics of the minorities are significantly worse than those of the white majority—not to mention that in this still racist society every institutional form discriminates, so that what inadequate health services exist are less available, less well distributed and less humanely applied. Those who live in isolated rural pockets, such as the Appalachian whites, are also distant from 20th-century medicine. Drug companies are in private hands, life-saving drugs are fantastically expensive, and many useless and even dangerous drugs are promoted for profit. The systems that have been provided to pay for health services for the poor reach only a fraction of those eligible for them.

Lack of resources and the uneven distribution of what resources exist will make nonsense of any legislative effort that addresses itself solely to the question of paying for services. The fact that payment can be had is of no interest to those who cannot find the services. And the vast majority of Americans will have no assurance that the care which is paid for is the care they need, or that it will be supported by the ambulatory services, the hospital services, the long-term services and the home services that are required for the restoration of their good health.

Paying from public funds for services received will not turn out more doctors or nurses or dentists or put them where they are needed. It won't increase the efficiency of hospitals or clinics or make them more responsive or gentle with the poor and black. A whole series of added steps will be required, many of which must go against the

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grain of present attitudes, professional interests and academic forms.

The cruelty lies in the fact that those who carry on the debate speak constantly as though what they were discussing was a national health *service,* and that is what the American people will think they have obtained when a national health *insurance* bill is passed. Ahead of them will lie the bitter discovery that those insured under a national health insurance act will be physicians and hospitals, not patients; that the guarantee will be of payment to the provider, not of service to the patient; that the entire legislative effort is geared and directed toward increasing the income of already affluent practitioners.

Those at present engaged in the development of the various health insurance bills are aware of this problem, but the line of argument they pursue is that organizational change, change in education and in distribution of health services and resources can be attained only after uniform financing has been accomplished by the passage of a national health insurance bill. Until the federal government takes responsibility for paying the medical bills, collects all the money in one spot, and then uses this gigantic financial leverage to enforce change, change will not take place. This is a perfectly reasonable argument except that experience teaches otherwise. The proponents of Medicare used the same logic, but since 1965 no change has been made in the system to improve the availability of services for those old people who cannot now obtain them (although it must be admitted that a real financial load has been taken off those old people who do get medical attention). It is quite possible that the introduction of a national health insurance bill will do no more to reform the system than has the Medicare Bill—in which case, we can look forward to no improvement or increase in availability of services but only to a shift in the source of payment for providers. Improved financing and organization must be introduced simultaneously and proceed in parallel.

For this reason, those interested in improving health services for the American people, as well as removing the economic barrier to health care, must develop a constituency that will support national health insurance while at the same time insisting that the law contain a series of mandatory requirements that will transform the system into an instrument to serve all the people. To this end, a number of additional elements will have to be introduced along with the insurance.

Organization. Given the great scarcity of physicians in the present system, the inefficiency of solo practice must be overcome. There are strong professional arguments against solo practice: complexity of modern medical knowledge and specialized care require team relationships; colleague supervision and consultation will guarantee better care. But even if this were not the case, the increased efficiency of group practice in manpower and equipment would dictate that doctors so organize.

Any insurance law should provide that doctors will be reimbursed *only* when practicing as groups. This will not work any hardship on rural or isolated areas, as is so often postulated. The association of doctors in isolated areas with larger community groups and better administrative and travel arrangements, will make it easier, not harder, to supply services.

Hospitals will have to become community resources with commitments to the groups of doctors practicing in those geographic areas. The arguments that go on interminably as to whether the hospital or the doctors should control the administration, budget, etc., are red herrings. The community should control the lot of them and community boards should receive the budget and allocate the funds. The wasteful mismanagement, duplication and inefficiency of present hospital relations, in which they compete instead of cooperating, has to stop. Patients must not be sent from one end of the city to another because a given hospital doesn't take that kind of case, or the patient can't pay, or the doctor has no privileges there. Hospitals are a community resource and should be so used. Any insurance law must provide for assigning a hospital budget to a geographic area controlled by a community board.

Contractual arrangements for paying physicians must be made between community organizations and groups of doctors. The site and location of physician services should be determined by the community and not left to the entrepreneurial motives of the doctors. The same applies to hospitals. The ambulatory, hospital and the long-term-care institutional systems should be made one.

A section of the law should provide that where local communities are unable to obtain health services, because of either lack of resources or the unwillingness of the provider to contract with the community, the federal government shall provide the services; funds from the health insurance trust must be made available to the federal government to carry out these objectives.

Financing. The elimination of fee-for-service will be the major contribution that a health insurance bill can make toward the regularization of the system. Block

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financing of all care will take away the incentive to cost-plus charging and encourage all the elements to be as efficient as possible.

Manpower. The critical lack of manpower is not caused entirely by an overall shortage. Rural areas have been losing their doctors and other professional people rapidly over the last few decades as people have been moving into the cities. *The New York Times* told recently of an Iowa community that had built a modern hospital with its own funds (against the advice and without the financial assistance of the hospital authority of the state) but then was unable to get doctors to staff it.

The ghettos have been losing doctors and professional personnel at an even greater rate as they flee the inner city for the white suburbs. A recent editorial in the *New England Journal of Medicine* reads:

> Boston has one of the highest concentrations of physicians in the world. Despite the abundance of physician manpower, residents of Metropolitan Boston, and especially residents of its lower income areas, face an increasingly critical shortage of primary-care physicians. Between 1940 and 1961, the supply of general practitioners in Boston and Brookline fell 50%, from 132.3 per 100,000 population to 67.0 per 100,000. During the same 21-year period, the number of internists, pediatricians, and obstetricians in Boston and Brookline with office addresses outside hospitals increased from 34.6 to 50.8 per 100,000 population, thereby replacing only 25% of the lost primary care manpower. The fact that New York City has experienced a similar decline in physicians during the seven-year period from 1959 to 1966 suggests that the disappearance rate of primary-care physicians accelerated during the past decade. Although general practitioners have tended to locate their offices with little regard to the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, specialists set up shop almost exclusively in comfortable surroundings. For example, the census tracts in Boston and Brookline that in 1960 contained the 40% of the population in the most favorable circumstances, house the offices of 51.5 of the general practitioners and 90.2 of the internists, pediatricians and obstetricians who were located in the community.

A number of steps must be taken to improve the manpower situation immediately. The medical school faculties now devote only part of their time to teaching. By funding medical education directly, instead of indirectly through service or research channels, larger numbers of faculty members can concentrate on teaching, which means that larger numbers of students can be accepted. Strong support of efforts by colleges not associated with universities, particularly the predominantly Negro colleges, to improve their science teaching could increase the number of minority students admitted to the enlarged medical student body that is visualized. Every student, on completion of training, should be expected to devote a number of years to community service.

Enough has been written in the past twenty years to demonstrate that the present allocation of duties in the medical hierarchy is dictated by economic self-interest and not by rational professional procedure. Too many doctors are doing things that people with twelve years of training should not do, and not enough people are being prepared with a few months or a few years of training to do those things doctors need not do. There is no established task mechanism or salary scale or career ladder to encourage a sensible distribution of the work.

The law should provide for reimbursement scales that allow intermediate workers—physician assistants, dental assistants, office aides, community health workers and the like—to be included in the system. Naturally the law cannot specify details, but its language must foster sensible and efficient manpower training and use.

In considering radical change from the traditional ways in which doctors are organized or educated or paid or moved to decide on their location of practice, the country must weigh the limitations of freedom for these practitioners against social needs. We are in an emergency situation in which millions of people do not obtain adequate, or any, medical care. Have we a right to make demands on the medical profession that will compel them to meet society's medical needs? Is entrepreneurial practice so sweet and fee-for-service so dear as to be purchased at the price of sickness and death for the poor and the black (to paraphrase an early American radical)?

How can we guarantee the quality of service for which the insurance will pay? How can we distribute the existing services so that all Americans will have access to them? Can we order doctors to practice in areas where they are needed? Can medical schools be ordered to change their curricula and admission policies to turn out the massive numbers needed? Can we get a national domestic health service corps to fill in the gaps? Will doctors accept the social responsibility for arranging to practice in the most productive rather than the most convenient way?

How the money is collected, how the administrative channels are set up, whether the private insurance companies or the nonprofit agencies like Blue Cross are involved and whether there will be representative boards of consumers and the like, are all very important and must be written into the law. But the heart of the law is the guarantee of service. Unless that is provided for, only income will be guaranteed—for physicians and hospitals.

Those who now fear a tidal wave of demand that will inundate any new system set up by law to guarantee medical services for all Americans, may be reassured by previous history. Who would have thought most hospitals could be brought into compliance with civil rights and safety standards in such a short time after passage of the Medicare Bill? If the day appointed for operation is set two years off, and the professions and officials set to work with a will, large numbers of trained personnel can be created and distributed, additional facilities built and staffed, and the administrative mechanism set in motion. Alternatively, phased participation can be mandated, perhaps by age groups. After all, the old people are already in a financing "system"; what is required is an organizational approach to assure them of appropriate care. Children and pregnant women could be phased in before the rest of the population, and a system of centers for maternal and child health care could be set up relatively easily.

The problem is not knowledge or techniques to accomplish this goal. The problem is will. □

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THE WEIMAR ANALOGY

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A widespread recognition that the moderate American Left is proving unequal to the challenges of a polarized society has led to a search for historical analogies. In particular, the example of late Weimar Germany is cited to prove (*a*) that America is heading through polarization to fascism and (*b*) that it is not. The one proof rests on the similarities between our period and the last years of the German Republic; the other on the differences. In fact, historical analogies prove nothing, in a predictive sense. They can, however, provide analytical categories which may assist in understanding contemporary events. In addition, the Weimar example provides a catalogue of political errors, and a demonstration of the dynamics of polarization, which are impressively relevant to our own difficulties.

Some recent attempts at the Weimar analogy have focused on those groups which called themselves "liberal." The moderate American Left naturally identifies itself with German liberalism, and particularly with the liberalism of the German Democratic party. Unfortunately, liberalism of this sort, committed to the ideals of parliamentary democracy and middle-class economic enterprise, ceased to be a significant force in Germany after the inflation of 1923, although its bankruptcy was not fully apparent until 1928. Its rapid decline was due, not so much to ideological factors as to the failure of the Democrats adequately to defend the economic interests of the German middle classes. The Democratic party provided a political home for certain journalists and intellectuals, notably Thomas Mann, but it was moribund well before the depression elections of 1930 dealt it and the other parties of the bourgeois middle the final blow. If modern American liberals are to look for their counterparts in the polarized Germany of the early 1930s, they must seek them in the ranks of the Social Democratic party, the SPD. Only the SPD combined an essentially liberal political orientation with a significant electoral base.

The original Marxist, revolutionary thrust of German Social Democracy was progressively weakened by dependence on the reform-minded, nonrevolutionary trade unions, and reformers gained a clear victory over revolutionaries in the years before World War I. The SPD participated with liberal bourgeois elements in the creation of the Weimar constitution, which was a model of representative democracy. By 1930, the party had committed itself to working for social justice within the democratic system it had helped to create. In our sense of the word, the Social Democrats were "liberals," and they trained two generations of German workers and intellectuals in the ideology of liberal reform. The revolutionary elements of the old SPD eventually found their way to the German Communist party, the KPD.

German political parties were chiefly concerned with representing the economic interests of their constituents. After the crises of the early 1920s the Weimar system achieved a rough equilibrium of economic forces. The representatives of big business, big labor and big agriculture, lobbyists in the guise of parliamentary deputies, bargained over the distribution of the national wealth. The process worked well enough during the boom period of the late 1920s, although the "System" (i.e., the political and economic "Establishment") was not responsive to the needs of "little men," small shopkeepers, independent peasants, and poorly organized white-collar workers. The System satisfied the economic demands of the politically most significant segments of the German population, and led the German worker to suppose that Weimar's political democracy was the best possible forum for the achievement of social justice without revolution.

But the depression broke down that fragile equilibrium. Economic catastrophe revealed the political strength of big business and big agriculture, and the superficiality of the democratic structure. The reactionary forces around President Paul von Hindenburg, representatives of the major financial and industrial enterprises and of the Prussian agricultural aristocracy, refused to make any compromise with labor. Under the guise of national emergency, austerity and fiscal responsibility, the German working classes were forced to bear the major costs of the depression, along with the underrepresented "little men." The SPD, outplayed at the bargaining table, left the government. It did not, however, abandon the Republic. It "tolerated" Bruening's attempt at a Hoover-style austerity program, avoiding a showdown with the government in order to preserve political stability.

That stability was in some danger, as a result of the polarization unleashed by the depression. The "little men," although they had complained since 1919 that they were underrepresented in the political process, had been mollified by the general prosperity of the late 1920s. Now, radicalized by economic pressures, they definitely rejected the System. Trained to patriotism and to a rejection of all forms of "proletarian" Marxism, they gave their votes to a revitalized and rapidly expanding Nazi party. Although they perceived that the government was dominated by economic forces largely responsible for their present distress, they were too closely bound up with the social order to contemplate genuine revolution. They accordingly turned their anger in a Fascist direction, against irrelevant enemies: Jews, Bolsheviks and the Versailles powers. The Nazis, with a program which combined the charms of an easily identifiable scapegoat with the recognition of genuine economic grievances, answered the political needs of the radicalized bourgeoisie and peasantry.

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Those German workers who rejected Social Democratic leadership when it failed to preserve the bargaining mechanisms of the System turned increasingly to the Communist party. The KPD also attracted radical intellectuals who had lost faith in the ability of the Republic to produce social change. The Communists launched an offensive against the "betrayers of the working class," the "Social Fascists," and were able to attract a growing proportion of the Social Democratic vote. Workers who had never voted before were also persuaded by the economic breakdown to vote Communist. Nazis and Communists together were able to paralyze the German Reichstag. In desperation, the SPD accepted the increasingly dictatorial measures of the Bruening regime, which turned to the Presidential decree as a substitute for ordinary legislation.

The legislative process ended entirely under the successive governments of Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher. The SPD failed to realize the implications of government by decree, a development which reached its logical climax with Papen's illegal coup against the Social Democratic state government of Prussia. Papen and Schleicher were aware that their reactionary regimes, responsive to the needs of the economically powerful, could not attract the support of the electorate. Monarchists without a monarchy, they attempted to co-opt the new forces of fascism. They saw that fascism, by directing economic anger against irrelevant enemies, tends to preserve the existing economic system. The German reactionaries, underestimating the strength of Hitler's egoism and failing to understand the nature of his personal power over his followers, hoped that the National Socialists would enter the government on terms set by the current leaders of German society. A German social revolution would thus be avoided by an alliance with the Nazis. Papen and Schleicher's efforts to co-opt all or part of the Nazi movement failed because Hitler insisted on total power for himself. Finally, in January 1933, an alliance of fascism and reaction was achieved, on Hitler's terms.

New York Post

While the Right struggled to reach agreement, Social Democracy retained faith in political democracy. The Communists were blamed equally with the Nazis for the enervation of German democracy. The SPD saw in the Republic the only escape from the polarized forces of Right and Left. But if German conservatives were monarchists without a monarchy, the Social Democrats were republicans without a republic. After the Nazi take-over, they went to death, imprisonment and exile as the last defenders of a system which had long since ceased to exist. They protested, but they did not revolt, and they adhered strictly to a set of rules which had already been torn up by their opponents.

It may well be that the Social Democrats had little choice. Any attempt after 1930 to find an alternative to the defunct Republic would have implied a form of revolution, and therefore collaboration with the Communists. The KPD, following Moscow in a slavish fashion, rejected any thought of compromise with "social fascism," and welcomed the destruction of the Republic as a necessary prelude to revolution. While the SPD fell victim to polarization, the KPD thrived on it, until the Nazis rolled up the entire Communist apparatus within a single week in February 1933. Only slowly did Stalin realize his mistake. When the call finally came for a "Popular Front," it was too late.

Every historical situation is unique, and contemporary America bears little superficial resemblance to late Weimar Germany. There is no depression, and no major Fascist movement threatens the traditional political parties. The American system still seems functional. An insistence on a literal resemblance between late Weimar Germany and contemporary America is obviously false, and invites disbelief. Even worse, it ignores a possibly useful aspect of the Weimar analogy. The differences between our system and that of the German Republic are at least as instructive as the similarities. It has already been noted that German parliamentary deputies belonged to parties normally tied to specific economic groups. German electoral law operated to split mandates in a manner roughly proportional to the division of the total popular vote. The parliamentary system dictated the frequent dissolution of the Reichstag during crisis periods. As a result of these factors, economic tensions were almost immediately reflected in the Reichstag and in the local parliamentary bodies. Our own electoral system, on the other hand, is based on the single-member district. Only parties capable of gaining pluralities in electoral districts are represented in Congress and in local legislatures. The system discourages the growth of third parties, even more at the Executive than at the legislative level. The election of members of independent extremist groups is prevented. For this reason, and because of the length of time between elections, the current trend toward polarization has not been reflected by a

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massive change in the formal political allegiance of our elected officials. Political parties of the far Right have failed to make their predicted impression.

The temptation is to ascribe the catastrophe of Weimar Germany to fatal constitutional flaws, which were exposed by the depression. Although this may be true, it would be wrong to conclude that a modern American fascism does not exist, or could not succeed. An independent Fascist movement of the sort many expected from the followers of Governor Wallace has failed to materialize, but American fascism exists nonetheless. One aspect of the recent polarization of our society has been the creation of a proto-Fascist mood in the electorate, caused by the failure of the American economic system to make good its unlimited promises. Americans, and particularly middle-class Americans, have lost their faith in unlimited economic progress. The twin issues of inflation and pollution indicate clearly the economic roots of contemporary political anger. On the Left, that anger is expressed in economic terms, and directed against the unfettered exercise of the profit motive. But the Right, hampered by its traditional attachment to the economic *status quo*, can deal with economic problems only on a piecemeal basis. The anger of citizens who feel that they are not getting their share finds its outlet in a search for scapegoats, for irrelevant enemies. The angry face of "middle America," twisted by new and traditional hatreds, is the face of fascism.

The new fascism is prevented from finding its fulfillment in a Fascist movement by the peculiarities of the American political system. Nevertheless, its power has been clearly demonstrated to our politicians, who are not themselves immune from its irrational appeal, by the enthusiasm generated by Spiro Agnew and George Wallace. It is a truism of long standing that American third parties do not make their mark by winning elections but by popularizing approaches which are then taken over by the major parties. Mr. Nixon has tested the political wind and found it to be blowing in an agreeable direction. It should be plain from recent events that the new forces have already largely captured the Executive branch of government. The situation in Congress is less clear. The recent expansion of the war, undertaken without prior consultation with Congressional leaders, may have strengthened opposition to the Administration. But it also clearly demonstrated legislative powerlessness. It is doubtful that a nervous and panicky Congress will be more successful than was the Reichstag in reintroducing itself into the government process.

By far the most frightening aspect of the growth of the new fascism has been its penetration into the system of law enforcement, particularly at the local level. Attorney General Mitchell's well-known views are echoed by police chiefs and district attorneys across the country. The courts have not adequately resisted the trend. Conviction and sentencing for political crimes have become almost commonplace, so that each new outrage produces only a mild sense of shock. The increasing use of injunctions is creating a parallel system of law, which makes individuals liable to criminal penalties without the ordinary protections of criminal justice. Repressive political actions by the police and the courts have already produced a chilling of constitutional rights. The protection afforded by the higher courts, available at enormous cost, has not yet been sufficiently tested. It is not likely to prove adequate.

As political tensions increase, more defendants will be denied their freedom pending appeal, held for further offenses, or subjected to punitive bail. The higher courts themselves are in any case responding to the changes in the political climate. Even the Supreme Court may soon lose its status as the ultimate defender of civil liberties. A brief look at what is happening to the legal system in America ought to convince any liberal of the force of the Weimar analogy. The analogy is rejected by those who mistakenly believe that Germany in the years before Hitler was a nightmare world, filled with premonitions of catastrophe (as in the musical *Cabaret*), while they naturally believe their own lives to be running in normal grooves. In fact, there was much of the normal, sane and everyday in Germany, both before and after 1933. And we may already be living in a nightmare.

In the face of a criminal foreign war and mounting repression at home, the radical Left has reopened the question of America. Although the militants have not made their strength felt in elections, as did the old KPD, they are obviously thriving and growing more radical in the present polarized situation. Like the KPD, the new radicals condemn the entire Establishment. They include in their indictment the moderate, liberal Left, and they claim that the American system has always been an obstacle to genuine justice. They preach revolution as the only alternative to fascism.

Liberalism has been no more successful than the SPD in meeting the challenge of polarization. Certain basic characteristics of the liberal political faith make it adapt poorly to a new and very illiberal political world. Liberalism tends toward a superficial view of politics. It assumes that men are rational political beings. Representative government is the "market place of ideas," rather than the battleground of ideologies. Long years of participation in power have persuaded liberals that wrongs can be righted, and that established procedures exist for the purpose. An original commitment to social justice has been translated into an easy faith in the American political process. Liberalism has rejected the prominent representatives of the rightist offensive, Agnew, Mitchell and Wallace. Repressive measures which overstep the formal bounds of law lead to forceful, and occasionally effective, protests by the moderate Left. The liberal conscience is assuaged by anti-war demonstrations and defense-fund contributions. Repression is answered by renewed attempts to make the American system work.

Liberalism, therefore, lumps those who reject the system, the militant radicals, together with the extreme Right, as it attempts a two-front war against "extremists of both sides." Typical was a recent telegram circulated by the American Jewish Committee to advertise a meeting of "40 national organizations . . . with some of the nation's top crime experts." The organizations included the Committee itself, the NAM, the ACLU, the NAACP, the YMCA, the AFL-CIO, the Urban League, the Jaycees, the Salvation Army and several churches. The

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purpose of the meeting: "to wrest law-and-order issue both from the extreme Right, which urges repression, and from the extreme Left, which threatens violence." In their demand for safer cities, cities safe from both ordinary criminals and political criminals, liberal organizations are willing to work together with very illiberal organizations, and with law-enforcement officials already deeply compromised by repressive tactics. The liberal organizations are behaving as if this were still a world where decent men with honest differences could find a middle ground for common purposes. Panicked by polarization, American liberals fall into the same error as did the SPD—they fail to ask themselves if the system they are defending any longer exists. The evidence would seem to indicate not. But if the system of measured justice and due process has ceased to exist, tolerable conditions can be restored only by some form of revolution. Liberal action within the system is effective only so long as the system itself remains liberal, responsive to new demands for social justice, and tolerant of dissent.

The inability of the moderate Left to discern the extent of the gains already made by fascism in America has led to an illusory distinction between "legal" and "illegal" violence. Governmental violence is decried, and radical violence is punished. A distinction is also drawn between legitimate and illegitimate dissent, but the boundaries are defined by the courts and the police. As long as liberal thinking is dominated by respect for a defunct system, realistic planning for political change is impossible.

A large portion of the blame for this dangerous situation falls to the radicals, who have also been faithfully following the German precedent. They are repeating the error of confusing "social democracy" with "social fascism." The liberal, aware of his own contribution to the cause of political and social morality, naturally rejects the radical accusation as historically inaccurate and personally offensive. The mindless devotion to violence of some elements in the radical camp deeply disturbs liberals, since it seems uncomfortably close to fascism. When liberalism ceases to reflect a political reality, it becomes nothing more than a moral code, to be defended against all who break it. Hampered by a devotion to their threatened principles of political behavior, liberals fail to realize that the only danger to America of any serious proportions is coming from the Right. Radicals are attempting without notable success to control the streets. The Right already controls the government.

For those who see no difference in the two extremist groups, and who at the same time recognize the powerlessness of liberalism to act alone, the reaction is despair. There is an evident danger that the malaise which afflicted the SPD in late 1932 and early 1933—a rejection of the present situation without the will to fight it—is now laming the moderate American Left. What is needed is something that has never been successfully attempted: a combination of liberalism's reasonable, humane elements, and revolutionary radicalism, with its commitment and willingness to sacrifice. The lessons of Weimar are a powerful incentive. Historical experience and our own everyday observations show that fascism draws no distinction among "Reds" of different shades. The present Administration is concerned, not with law and order but with repression and murder. It is time for moderates and radicals to recognize that they are both in the same boat—and that it is sinking. □

UNITED FRUIT

THE GREAT WHITE EMPIRE

DESMOND SMITH
Mr. Smith is a frequent contributor. From time to time, he will report on other companies that dominate the American corporate empire.

> Right now, hundreds of miles to the south, a sleek white ship is cutting through the sea, bringing the bananas we will eat next week. On the land, shaded from the hot sun by broad banana leaves, a man is harvesting the bananas we will eat the week after next.
>
> *School Material Provided by the United Fruit Co.*

Those are indeed pretty scenes, but the company's handsome booklet, "People Like Bananas," hardly tells the whole story. For instance, the United Fruit Company does not like to be called *el pulpo* (the octopus), but that is its name in Latin America. The company does not care to be reminded that it has ruined independent planters, opposed organized labor, supported coups, exploited workers and played ball with dictators, but that is the history the Latin Americans remember. The company does not like to be described as a monopoly, but that is how the Department of Justice put it when it filed an antitrust suit against United Fruit in 1954. The company likes to think all such facts are, in the words of its chairman, John M. Fox of Boston, nothing more than "a spicy legend."

There is nothing legendary about United Fruit's grasp on the economic life of Central America. The initials UFC are visible on office buildings in Panama; on signposts along the entire north coast of Honduras; on warehouses in Costa Rica; on billboards, plantations and ships' funnels; on the schools, hospitals, port facilities and railroads operated by the company. No *campesino* is confused about *el pulpo*; the evidence engulfs him.

The company's prodigious banana empire extends from Tela in Honduras to San Jose in Costa Rica, from Panama City to Santa Marta in Colombia. All together, this vast tropical farm grosses more than half a billion dollars a year, and employs some 60,000 people. The company manages to do all this with surprisingly little

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fanfare. Everybody knows that the yearly operating revenues of General Motors exceed those of all but the dozen richest nations of the world. Few know that the annual sales of United Fruit exceed the combined national budgets of Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.

United Fruit is the world's biggest fruit company, and the fruit in question is, of course, the banana. Americans ate 11 billion bananas last year; every second banana was grown, packed, shipped and sold by United Fruit. Seldom has financial history known an idea so successful. Carrying the theories of Adam Smith to their logical limit, the company has concentrated its banana plantations in Central America, where production costs are lowest, and built up its sales where the market is richest. It is an empire built on the stoop labor of six republics—seventy years of Central American poverty and North American dividend checks.

A Honduran farmer interested in growing bananas can no more ignore United Fruit than he can ignore a man with a gun. If he wants to sell his crop, he is bound to consider the fact that 80 per cent of Honduran exports are bananas and all but a fraction of these are shipped by United Fruit. And if he complains about this state of affairs, he is likely to be reminded that without United Fruit his nation would be broke. Barely a decade ago, it was official U.S. policy to create an "alliance for progress" in Latin America. Today, as a glance at the most recent UN economic report will show, Latin America is poorer than it was thirty years ago. One-third of its population lives in slums; life expectancy in some areas is 28.

In Central America, long United Fruit's personal fiefdom, the company's cephalodic embrace is total. For the rulers of these republics are, in general, pro-Catholic, pro-military and pro-property, and thus strongly disposed to look upon United Fruit as an extension of U.S. foreign policy and therefore the protector of their regimes. Consider the circumstances in which these "client states" find themselves. In Guatemala, Honduras and Costa Rica, United Fruit is the biggest single landowner, the biggest single business, and the largest employer of labor. In Panama, with the single exception of the Canal itself, United Fruit is the biggest employer and a potent force in local politics. In Colombia and Ecuador—nations that are poor even by Latin American standards—*el pulpo*'s squeeze is only slightly diminished. It does not take a Marxist such as Régis Debray to discover a special relationship between capitalism and underdevelopment. Since the turn of the century, United Fruit has been developing its banana empire. The result is that today the typical banana republic has a badly skewed economy, incapable of supplying itself with even a modest range of goods. There are signs, still faint, that time is catching up with the company. For years its incomparable and monumental greediness has been the shame of Latin America. Now the forces of change —encouraged by Marxism and Fidelism—are slowly working their way up through Latin American politics.

United Fruit Co. owes its existence to an earlier period of great change—the burst of star-spangled imperialism led by Theodore Roosevelt, with his "big stick." The founder of the firm, Andrew Preston, was one of a generation of businessmen who grasped the implications of Roosevelt's declaration that the United States had the right to "international police power" in the event of "flagrant cases of wrong doing" (by any American republic). In the beginning United Fruit bought its bananas from independent farmers in the West Indies; but the West Indies were often struck by hurricanes, and Preston began to look elsewhere around the Carribbean for a less exposed source of supply.

One of the most seriously determined men who ever lived, Preston took over the Costa Rican properties of a nearly bankrupt railroad builder named Minor Keith. To Cuba, Santo Domingo, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua and Honduras he sent ambitious young men to oversee the company's new banana plantations. To penetrate ever further into the "American tropics" became Preston's consuming ambition. When banana land failed, either through storm damage or disease, it was abandoned. Entire districts, once prosperous, became "highlands of weeds." Despite local complaints, once the company was through with the land it removed everything—telephones, bridges rails, housing. As the banana lands died, so did the surrounding communities.

When Preston himself died in 1924, the board of directors could reckon that United Fruit was an extra government in the Caribbean, owning or leasing some 4 million acres of tropic lands from Cuba to Ecuador, 1,500 miles of railroads, ports, harbors and entire cities. It controlled legislators in half a dozen Central American republics, and Preston's Great White Fleet had expanded from fourteen banana steamers to ninety-five.

United Fruit's chief competition in this period came from the Cuyamel Fruit Company. Cuyamel was bossed by a tough-minded Bessarabian named Samuel Zemurray, a man both violent and shrewd. When United Fruit arrived, Zemurray was building a railroad in Honduras to ship his bananas; the Honduran Government gave him enormous grants of land along the right of way. That Zemurray played politics was inevitable; he demanded concessions in exchange for taxes, and customs-free import of railroad material. Thus it was not in Cuyamel's interest when the U.S. Secretary of State—acting on behalf of certain New York banking interests—arranged to finance the Honduran debt, the loan to be repaid out of customs duties. With Gen. Manuel Bonilla, an ex-President of Honduras, Zemurray cooked up a successful revolution. As he said: "If the banks were running Honduras and collecting their loans from customs duties, how far would I have gotten when I asked for a concession?" Zemurray got his concessions. In 1929 he sold his company to his old rival for $32 million in stock. In 1932, with the backing of certain Boston banks and trust companies, Zemurray took over United Fruit.

The company has an awesome investment which it is determined to protect; and what it fears most is expropriation. It will do everything in its power—including changing an "unfriendly" government—to prevent it. In 1954 the democratically elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, ordered the expropriation of 178,000 acres of United Fruit plantations, these to

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

be divided among small farmers. For tax purposes, United Fruit had valued the land at $525,000 and the government proposed to pay it that sum in the form of twenty-five-year bonds. United Fruit retaliated by demanding *$15 million* as the true worth of its property. The stalemate was broken by a "revolution" staged from next-door Honduras. United Fruit denied financing and organizing the overthrow of the Arbenz government, but all talk of expropriation ceased when a military dictator moved into the National Palace.

In recent years—perhaps it has seen the writing on the walls of its properties?—the company has been trying to reduce its dependence on the banana trade. It has acquired A & W International, one of the nation's largest drive-in restaurant chains, and not long ago it absorbed Baskin-Robbins, Inc., an ice-cream chain which added 111 new stores last year. J. Hungerford Smith Co., a producer of syrups and ice-cream toppings is now a subsidiary. Through Inter-Harvest, Inc., another subsidiary, the company is applying the Chiquita trademark to lettuce and is test-marketing a line of prepared salads.

But for the predictable future there is still no source of revenue that can replace the kind of profits that gush from the banana empire. The company's fixed investment there—in plantations, real estate, roads, railways, port facilities and equipment—is about $359 million. In addition, the offshore investments—banana boats, packing and marketing facilities—cannot pay off unless United Fruit continues to exercise its territorial imperative.

When Latin American economists like Raul Prebisch speak of "international division of labor" and "anachronistic trade patterns" what they are up against, in reality, is the superb marketing facilities of firms such as United Fruit. And when it exploits its worldwide apparatus United Fruit deals with heads of state as though it were itself a nation-state rather than a foreign company. Sooner or later, even countries as torpid as Honduras and El Salvador will question the power of United Fruit. At Viña del Mar in Chile, a couple of years ago, twenty-one nations drafted the "Latin American Consensus of Viña del Mar." It plainly stated South American unhappiness with the *status quo*. Colombia's President Carlos Lleras followed up the Viña del Mar message with a warning that relations between the two hemispheres were likely to grow worse if the United States did not "generate new patterns of trade and remove harmful practices and irritating conditions."

Rodrigo Botero Montoya, a 35-year-old Colombian economist who is one of President Lleras' economic advisers told *Fortune* magazine:

> In the exploitation of natural resources, the facts of life have changed. A few years ago, developed countries, because of their technology, could impose their own terms. But the price for us was too high. We can't accept the proposition in which all we are left is an empty hole in the ground—you take away the resources and we take the empty hole.

But after seventy-one years of exploiting its banana empire, United Fruit has no intention of giving up because of what *Fortune* calls "dangerous economic nationalism." Nowadays the company is off on a new tack. Like IBM, International Harvester, Unilever, and International Telephone & Telegraph, United Fruit is beginning to think of itself as a "multi-national" corporation. To be sure, it is owned and run by Americans. No Latin American holds a substantial bloc of shares, none sits on its board of directors. Nevertheless the company frowns upon the word "foreign" when used to describe where the dividends go. Sensitive as never before to charges of corporate colonialism, United Fruit studies to play down its national identity. As Herbert C. Cornuelle, its former president, told a group of European businessmen recently: "Among the most important reasons for the internationalization of the multi-national corporation is to *increase its utility* in the developing world of Latin America. . . . [the] principal limitation in carrying out its development function is its own national identity which carries with it questions of purpose, profits and power which make it naturally suspect."

Recently, the company has been showing signs of enlightened self-interest. "Young people who grew up and attended school on banana plantations hold important jobs in government and business in their countries," says one of its pamphlets. It is working to abolish disease, provide schools and Christian education in its territories; and it is now often willing to share its know-how (but not its profits).

After seven golden decades at the expense of Central America, *el pulpo* is running scared. As Rodrigo Botero Montoya has observed, "the facts of life have changed." If the remark was meant as a warning, it found its mark.

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So far no grating sound comes from the sleek machinery that manufactures profits for United Fruit. So far no Cesar Chavez has risen from the ranks of *campesinos* toiling in the steaming banana plantations. Nowadays when United Fruit's executives address their business colleagues, they like to enlarge on the global theme—bananas for the world, packed, shipped, distributed and, of course, grown by United Fruit. Recently, one company executive was actually overheard quoting Teilhard de Chardin. As he described it, United Fruit "saw a great convergence between nations, races and peoples, and within nations between management, labor and government." What Samuel Zemurray might have said to that in his waterfront English would have been worth hearing. But Zemurray ran United Fruit in the days when he could rent Machine Gun Molony's private army to chase an unfriendly government. Nowadays all Chairman Fox has got is the Hickenlooper Amendment.

How much longer Mr. Fox can maintain the foreign empire of the United Fruit Company is conjecture. He and his staff are obviously putting a lot of faith in the convergence theory. Given a continuation of present political circumstances in Central America, the Great White Fleet might go on sailing forever. United Fruit might become the agricultural analogue of General Motors, producing standardized fruit for both the rich and the poor nations of the world. However, such rosy visions are hazardous, particularly for a company whose vast concessions and labor practices have never been submitted to popular plebiscite. The political climate in Central America would not have to get very tough before United Fruit found itself looking anxiously to the State Department for relief. After a few more years of watching a disproportionate share of their foreign earnings being repatriated to the United States, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador and Costa Rica may well do some converging on their own. Should that happen, United Fruit would be left with nothing but its Great White Fleet and the Chiquita trademark. No one in Boston likes to think of such things. □

RUNNING THE CAMPUS

A SCHOOL IS NOT A STATE

BLANCHE D. BLANK
Mrs. Blank was executive director of the Mayor's Task Force on City Personnel in New York. She is professor of political science at Hunter College.

One by-product of the nation's campus confrontations has been the spawning of plans for governing colleges and universities. These documents are meant to provide systems for making the institutions so flexible, responsive and generally satisfactory that future confrontations will be unnecessary. Unfortunately, we already know that this hope will not be fulfilled. The failures (past, present and future) are caused not only by those complex issues that lie well beyond the reach of any college system (issues deep within the community or deep within the student); they stem also from the plans themselves. Most of the new arrangements could not possibly yield any of the alterations that sincere reformers have been wanting. Specifically, they will produce no upgrading of teaching performance, no reduction of irresponsibility, confusion and duplication of effort, and certainly no greater efficiency in the use of educational resources. The new statutes may indeed politicize the colleges; they will hardly rationalize them. A typical document merely tinkers with methods of representation. It bolsters the existing irrational mix of college committees with spurious "ratios" of various academic groups, few of which have any claim to legitimacy.

It is ironic that most of the innovators, although they may inveigh against the insanities of the American political system, slavishly imitate its pluralist model in the plans they themselves evolve. They choose to overlook the capacity of "interest group politics" for deadlock; they ignore its essentially elitist character. They also forget that such reforms as giving the vote to women—or 18-year-olds—have never altered the fundamentals of our politics or the resultant policies. There is no reason to suppose that the university response to similar changes will be different. The new codes are a response to rhetoric, not reality. There is talk of sharing power where power often does not exist. There is talk of instituting democracy with little understanding of its actual scope and meaning. Indeed, there is talk of "governance" when the talk should be of "administration." Because of these basic misunderstandings, the typical scheme of government might better serve an emerging nation than a traditional university.

While there is undoubtedly an area of overlap between the concepts of governing and administrating, and while I am deeply committed to the idea that all American organizations must respond to the concepts of civil liberties and due process, there is nonetheless a sound basis for deciding when voting mechanisms are appropriate and when they are not. There is also a basis for deciding when a voting procedure is genuinely democratic and when it is misrepresentation. But the actual implications of their words and deeds escape most campus activists. Their espousal of a spurious labor-management style of bargaining compounds this problem. Recently at Hunter College, for example, one could "tune in" on the "negotiations" over closed-circuit television. This immediately shuts off rational analysis as well as realistic compromise. The "negotiators" (and the "teams" substitute players interminably) are often playing to the gallery and occasionally they are playing for quite per-

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sonal stakes. Yet the broadcast is called for in the interests of democracy and is often a condition insisted upon by the so-called radicals.

Students and faculty alike (across the entire liberal-conservative spectrum) appear unable to distinguish between a political complex and a single institution. The former may necessitate the logic of democracy; the latter requires only the logic of organization. Democratic theory holds a properly sanctified position in our nation, but it is appropriately invoked only in situations where there is a lack of skill and/or a lack of moral certainty. Under such circumstances a reliance on majoritarian mechanisms becomes necessary. But when one is dealing with relatively limited, well-defined, special-purpose institutions (institutions, moreover, that must and do claim special competence, as I shall explain later), the ground rules of organization theory—that is, mechanisms for rational decision making—are far more applicable. One does not, for example, expect to build bridges, run transport systems or provide atomic energy through voting and representational procedures. Nor would we expose our moral certainties like freedom of speech or religion to the polls. A college may pose greater classification problems than a bridge-building authority or a church, but it is still more likely to emerge as a kind of organization than as a kind of political state.

In fact, a sense of survival as well as logic should prove to the college community that it *had better emerge as an organization*—and a highly professional one at that. If we were seriously to pursue the notion of the university as a political community, then the democratic principles that presumably should and do guide us in dealing with genuine political problems would have to be followed. That would require that policy making be vested in the *legitimate* political community. In the case of universities that would be the general citizenry of either the state or city (not some mix of students and faculty). Indeed, this democratic logic already prevails in the operation of public institutions of higher education; it will surely spread to the private ones as soon as the taxpayers become aware that they are shouldering the bulk of those bills as well. But that is not the conclusion that any university wishes to accept. The history of higher education has long been marked by a fight (in my judgment entirely justified) of the university to stay as clear as possible of the partisan politics of the outside world. There is all too much evidence that politicization in that sense is the road to domination. Freedom for a university requires autonomy. And *autonomy will garner public support only to the degree that the public is convinced that the enterprise is precious and expert.*

Nor can colleges expect tax support if they pretend to be mere private enterprises—entourages of individuals gather to "do their own thing." What remains, then, is the possibility of retaining credibility with the community as a specialized institution having very professional skills for the performance of a highly valued service. If the ivy-covered walls do not house special talent, what do they provide? Any reasonable person must surely notice that the paraphernalia of education is easily available in all large cities. Museums, libraries, music centers, theatres, zoological gardens, and so on, are accessible and often free. The chief ingredient a college adds is an instructional staff. And in an age of inexpensive paperback books and proliferating journals the chief function of such a staff is to select, organize, explain, interest and evaluate. (Professors may contribute new knowledge, but this is relatively rare and usually of little interest to undergraduate students.) Thus those who choose to go to college and those who directly or indirectly pay for college—no matter what the rhetoric—are asking for and getting essentially two items: leadership and legitimization. And these two activities actually do require, and must be recognized as requiring, *professional competence and expertise.*

With this view of the situation in mind, students, faculty and administration might note that they are today, as ever, allies in a common fight to preserve their hard-won freedom to work, speak, write and dissent in the search for and propagation of truth and knowledge. Moreover, recognition that a college is an organization *within* a polity may help all hands to recall that an academic reputation is a fragile thing. It cannot long withstand persistent fouling of the nest by either students or faculty. A sane faculty wishes its students to be thought excellent, and a sane student body wishes its faculty to be admired abroad. No one wishes to collect a devalued coin. And few wish to pursue a coin so unusual that it will not fit any of the slots available for it in the outside world. These, then, are the factors that should cement family relations, that should underlie academic government.

A genuinely new college charter requires placing real power realistically. Students should have power to determine their own needs, and power to judge their instructors' ability to teach. Faculty needs power to control curriculum, evaluate research, judge the nonteaching merits of their colleagues and deans, and evaluate the competence of their students as scholars. Administration needs power to rationalize overall budget allotments, operate housekeeping facilities, and coordinate the resources of the college so as to keep its activities closely congruent with its stated goals.

More specifically, this means that students need genuine freedom of choice among colleges and within colleges. This would dictate that, wherever possible, financial support should go to individual students rather than to institutions; that there should be as much freedom in the curriculum as is consistent with an institution's overall goals; and that individual faculty names be attached to all courses before a student must make his choice. It also means that students should be given the power to judge their teachers—as teachers. This should be done systematically, consistently and confidentially.

The record should contain all relevant information about the student rater as well as about the course, and it should permit ample time and numbers to insure that a final judgment on teaching ability is sufficiently seasoned to be secure against charges of civil liberty violations. Proper grievance procedures must also be guaranteed. After all necessary precautions have been taken, however, the students' rating of teaching aptitude must be given heavy weight in appointment and tenure deci-

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sions. Students would not now be asking to substitute for faculty performance, if in the first place they had had some leverage in evaluating that performance. To this issue few of the new plans speak at all; when they do, it is with insufficient clarity and vigor.

Faculties should devote themselves to selecting, developing and retaining the best possible teaching talent, as well as research talent. They must be ready to establish *clear priorities* as to what kinds of talent are needed, to what degree and where. This requires both faculty and administrative power. The degree to which staff time should be devoted to conferences, consultations, conventions and committees must be jointly evaluated and decided. It is then up to the administration to arrange housekeeping and management procedures that will enforce the priorities and keep the institution in line with its stated goals. Colleges do not need more or larger agencies for this type of decision making; they need fewer. Genuine power in the hands of some key officials who can be held accountable through public records, and who are systematically reviewed, and if need be, fired—that is more to the point. With an eye again to due process, deans and presidents should be subject to recall.

While in office, however, most college presidents need much more power to control the budget allotments on a college-wide basis. Deans and department heads should be in charge of budgets at their respective levels. All decisions should be made public annually, and provisions should be made for mandatory outside professional reviews of the college, its divisions and departments. These ideas stem from my conviction that what frustrates sound education in most institutions is not only inadequate budgets but irrational ones. Nothing in the structure of today's typical plans of government mandates the use of publicly and clearly stated priorities and scientifically evaluated alternatives in the allocation of resources. Sloppy incrementalism is still the order of the day. Budgetary and administrative reforms of the type just outlined are at the heart of any genuine improvement in college life. Yet on these matters the new constitutions are usually silent.

Finally, the typical college scheme continues unabated the confused lines of responsibility and duplication of effort that have led on most campuses to the very outbreaks that called for the revisions. Once again, democratic theory will not help; organization theory will. It is not a question of who is on a committee but why you need the committee at all. For example, a curriculum decision at a college in the City University usually goes through no less than five committees and is legally binding (usually after an entire year of hard work by scores of professors and, more recently, dozens of students) only after it is agreed to by the Board of Higher Education. And all of this for a few lines in an annually revised and intrinsically meaningless catalogue. (Any experienced student or professor can assure you that the four-line course description so tortuously evolved and so continuously revised, has little to do with what the professor may actually say in any given semester.) In my view, such decisions (with a few interdisciplinary exceptions) should begin and end with the faculty of the department concerned.

Student "input" on curriculum will come through their course evaluations as well as through their actual choice of courses, to say nothing of normal discourse with their professors. Further curriculum sanity will be provided by the mandatory professional reviews advocated above. Beyond that, all that can be said is that deep-rooted and continuing disagreements among professionals as to what is appropriate in a discipline—or indeed in a college—must eventually be solved by clear-cut differentiation, or splintering. This is, after all, the classic method. When psychiatrists, physicists or even artists disagree, they do not try to negotiate or vote a settlement among themselves or with outside nonprofessionals. They simply move apart and establish new "schools," from among which novices may freely choose. In these matters, therefore, faculty should hardly be concerned with retaining a balance of power (as they consistently do in these governing committees); they should notice instead how little power they actually have and try to remedy *that*.

Making the judgment that a university is more an organization than a sovereign state does not mean the advocacy of some computerized leviathan. Few organizations survive if they do not satisfy their clientele and mobilize their staff. This means that genuine consultation and feedback are essential. It is particularly true of organizations that do not hold monopolies. Today, universities are in a competitive situation. There are almost 3,000 institutions of higher education in the nation and more than forty in the metropolitan area of New York City alone. Students can therefore do their most effective voting with their feet. To a degree, pension mobility makes this possible for faculty as well. And the ever increasing flexibility of curriculum makes internal choice a reality. Students need not (and should not) rely on symbolic votes within often impotent committees in situations where they have evident disadvantages in the usual sources of power—that is, of time, skill and favors to distribute. (It is an ironic case in point that during the recent disturbances at Hunter College one of the student negotiators on a "fifty-fifty" committee had to approach one of his supposed adversaries for aid in admittance to graduate school.)

With all these thoughts in mind, I propose that university government move in directions different from the current fashions. The university should plot its course in terms of enduring values not ephemeral epithets. It must proceed along lines of well-researched group and organization theory while retaining all the basic commitments to democracy and humanitarianism. Therefore: (*1*) Let decisions be made at the lowest level consistent with the availability of information and experience necessary for it. (*2*) Let those in power be visible, responsible and responsive; not numerous and powerless. (*3*) Let institutional procedures reflect an emphasis on methods for removing incompetence, publicizing decisions and their reasons; and on the adjudication of grievances with full due process and complete observance of civil liberties for the entire academic community. Then we can all return to our proper work. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

In a World of Analysis

LETTERS OF ALDOUS HUXLEY. *Edited by Grover Smith. Harper & Row. 992 pp. $15.*

BEVERLY GROSS

"I am one of the world's worst correspondents and always have been and, I fear, always will be": hardly justified self-criticism for a man who wrote, as his editor estimates, at least 10,000 letters. This very thick volume is a selection of 943 examples of what is supposed to be a lost art in this century. Aldous Huxley, despite his disclaimer, was a devout letter writer. The most trivial of literary forms was for Huxley a vehicle for extensive, serious and meditative communication. His letters, even the most casual, are often miniature essays on selected topics.

A volume of correspondence is a highly refracted form of autobiography. Although it gives only a ragged sense of the contours of a life, in some ways it can highlight it more vividly. Sometimes oddly: the most suggestive aspect of this volume is what it reveals about Huxley in purely negative terms. The letters are notable for what they do not contain. They are remarkably impersonal—which is not to say that Huxley effaces himself in them but that they offer surprisingly little sense of the vibrant self, the immediate moment. They show character—in the Aristotelian sense: a moral stamp—but not much personality. Huxley may have been one of the least self-conscious of modern writers: "I have almost no ideas about myself and don't like having them—avoid having them—on principle . . . for the self only exists in relation to circumstances outside itself and introspection which distracts one from the outside world is a kind of suicide."

His intelligence, too, was essentially Aristotelian. The world for him was a knowable quantity, apprehensible through observation and reason. His comments on everything—ethics, politics, the two global wars, art, even mysticism and psychedelic experience—are formed by a strict analytical intelligence. There is illuminating truth in the old saw about Huxley, that he was a novelist who wrote like a scientist. He *thought* like a scientist: his talents, predilections and intellectual passions were scientific. Like his older brother Julian (the scientist who writes like a novelist), Aldous was much more the heir of his grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley than of his great-uncle Matthew Arnold. As a student at Eton he had been bent on pursuing a scientific career (his earliest letters, particularly to Julian, are enthusiastically packed with geologic and botanical observation), but a serious eye disease rendered him nearly blind at 16. Unable to continue his intended study of biology, he turned instead, almost by default, to literature.

He accepted his fate with grace, and pursued his writing career with a diligence that closely resembles devotion (he published forty-six books, including eleven novels, six short story collections, two volumes of poetry, and three plays). Nowhere in these letters is there any explicit word of dissatisfaction or regret. But throughout his life, as these letters obliquely testify, the major abiding interest in his life remained scientific investigation.

As far as I know there is no opposite term for novelist *manqué*. Huxley may well be the only instance of a man who wrote novels despite himself. The evidence of his letters elucidates something that critics have long noted about Huxley's fiction: its brittle lifelessness. At his best Huxley could be a brilliant and penetrating social satirist. But satire is only an uncertain offshoot of the fictive mode; it is more essentially an act of criticism than of creativity. "I know how to deal with abstract ideas but not with people," Huxley admitted; and whatever comments he made about the genesis and technique of his novels consistently reveal how thoroughly subordinated their autonomous vitality was to whatever idea, whatever satiric point, they were propelled by.

To his father in 1926 he wrote about his work on *Point Counter Point*:

> I am very busy preparing for and doing bits of an ambitious novel, the aim of which will be to show a piece of life, not only from a good many individual points of view, but also under its various aspects such as scientific, emotional, economic, political, aesthetic etc. The same person is simultaneously a mass of atoms, a physiology, a mind, an object with a shape that can be painted, a cog in the economic machine, a voter, a lover etc etc. I shall try to imply at any rate the existence of the other categories of existence behind the ordinary categories employed in judging everyday emotional life. It will be difficult, but interesting.

Probably his best novel, *Point Counter Point*, was thus generated out of a thesis. That seemed always to be the case: never a character, never a situation, the inspiration was always an idea. He was given to discussing his current work in progress almost exclusively by its germinating kernel: "I am writing a novel about the future [*Brave New World*]—on the horror of the Wellsian Utopia and a revolt against it. Very difficult. I have hardly enough imagination to deal with such a subject." Imagination, one gathers, was only a technical constituent for fleshing out the prior inspiration.

> I am thinking now about a novel [*Eyeless in Gaza*]. The theme, fundamentally, is liberty. What happens to someone who becomes really very free—materially first (for after all liberty must depend very largely on property) and then mentally and emotionally. The rather awful vacuum that such freedom turns out to be. But I haven't yet worked out the whole of the fable—only the first part.

And again about a novel he worked on in 1938 but never completed:

> I've been at work on a kind of novel which is, at the same time as a story of people, an analysis of narratives in general, of the nature of individuality, of the relationship between words and things—the whole culminating, I hope, in some kind of general theory of the world.

One notes in these extracts Huxley's fear of a failure of imagination, the telling sign that he considered his fictions to be "fables," the halfheartedness of the reassurance that his grandiose novel "offering some kind of general theory of the world" is still going to be "a story of people." Nor was he especially astute in his literary judgment of other writers' stories of people: he wrote in 1915 about the suppression of Lawrence's *The Rainbow* that "the book is so dull that no one would under ordinary circumstances read it"; in 1918 of Joyce's *Ulysses* that though brilliant, "it has a slight flavour of excrements"; and in 1946 of Camus' *The Stranger* that "it is rather good, but a bit pointless."

Huxley was fully aware of his questionable calling as novelist. He had n need to doubt his skill, dedication, ev

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his talent—what he lacked, and he knew it, was the novelist's sensibility and passion for life. "I remain sadly aware that I am not a born novelist, but some other kind of man of letters, possessing enough ingenuity to be able to simulate a novelist's behaviour not too unconvincingly." He analyzed it even more crucially in a note to Sybille Bedford:

> I was born wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born, and have made, in a curious way, the worst of both. For each requires that one should be wholeheartedly *there*, at the moment—with Micawber, as he is and for his own sake, while he is drinking his punch: with the Clear Light of the Void as it is and for its own sake, in an analogous way. Whereas I have always tended to be somewhere else, in a world of analysis, unfavourable equally to Micawberish living, Tolstoyan art and contemplative spirituality. The title of my first book of stories, *Limbo*, was, I now see, oddly prophetic!

Still, comparatively little is contained in these letters about Huxley's fictive writing. He could expatiate at great length about the ideas he was working out in other sorts of books: literary journalism, histories, travel pieces, polemics. If the extent of these discussions provides any measure of Huxley's own involvement, then the books that meant the most to him might very well be *The Art of Seeing* (to propagate the success Huxley had achieved under the Bates method of Sight Without Glasses), *Grey Eminence* and *The Devils of Loudon* (two historical accounts), and, leading all others, *The Doors of Perception* (based on Huxley's mescaline experience, "with reflections on its philosophical, aesthetic and religious implications"). His engagement with *Brave New World*, by this test, would seem to have been considerably less intense than with *Brave New World Revisited*, not a work of fiction but a group of essays documenting what his novel thirty-two years before had merely envisioned: the new totalitarianism of mind-control, the techniques "which might be used by rulers for keeping their subjects in order and even loving their servitude."

His assessments, through the decades, of the political and cultural tendencies of this century are often remarkably keen, even visionary. He wrote, for instance, to Julian in 1918 that the global cataclysms produced by World War I "will end by America having to go in for [Theodore] Roosevelt poetically 'Preparedness for Ever,' in order to [illegible] volution in the rest of the world [illegible] which only America can [illegible] she is the only definitely anti-socialistic nation among the great powers."

Huxley's relation to America is of steady interest in these letters. As a young man he repeatedly expressed a supercilious, mocking antipathy for the American character:

> I have been re-reading *Martin Chuzzlewit* and the letters from America printed in the *Life of Dickens*; the people—at any rate to judge from the specimens one meets here and from what they write—are just the same; the same interminable canting balderdash about high moral principles and ideals, couched in the same verbose, pseudo-philosophic, sham-scientific, meaningless language, the same pretentiousness then as now. One thing, however, which they didn't seem to have invented in Dickens's day is that awful chivalry—that spoiling of women by the men—which makes most of the American women one meets so intolerably importunate for attention, so cock-sure that you are going to be interested in their "poysonalities."

"Well worth reading—" the young Huxley remarked about a book he had just read, "and for the work of an American professor, not badly written—in a language bearing quite an appreciable resemblance to English."

Huxley came to the United States in 1937 where he lived—chiefly in Los Angeles—until his death in 1963. (He never became a citizen. A committed pacifist, he let his application for naturalization lapse because he could not in conscience swear to defend the Constitution.) Settling in the United States would appear to be an astonishing breach but, as he admitted, "Unlike Dr. Johnson, I prefer climate to conversation." The adjustment seems to have been surprisingly untroubled: Huxley remained as a matter of choice, and from the beginning gave every indication of feeling quite at home.

The United States, of course, was the best place in the world for fueling his satiric fires (how delighted he was to inform his son and daughter-in-law that he had just been remarried at the Drive-In Wedding Chapel at Yuma, Ariz.). But perhaps the best explanation for why he stayed was that America was the place to sharpen his vision—and I mean something quite beyond the physical ministrations of the Bates method, which, Huxley was convinced, had performed wonders for his eyesight. Much more at issue was his insight: America was for him a rare stimulation—the laboratory of the future.

His later books, like *Ape and Essence* and *The Island*, were projections based on his observation of the society that was clearly to set the pattern for things to come. Novels of the future, they were neither science fiction nor utopian fantasy but social prediction. Though hardly a prophet, Huxley had considerable powers of penetration. His grasp on the emerging future is attested to, most remarkably, in this statement following some thoughts about the new tyranny of technocracy; written in 1959, it is a notable prevision of what today has come to be designated as the counter-culture:

> It may be that the only satisfactory solution (from a human point of view) is to accept the inevitability of the technification of everything, with its consequent impoverishment of social relations, and to impart to children and young people, along with their technical education, a psychological education in the art of being spontaneous, of becoming de-conditioned, of passing at will from the cultural world of concepts and the technical world of the cult of efficiency in all things, into the personal world of direct experience of events outside us and events within. It would be a question of tempering technique, ever more perfect, and ever more all-embracing and totalitarian, with a kind of Zen training in spontaneity, in de-conditioning, in becoming open.

Huxley had already had his mind blown: in his 60s he began taking mescaline, peyote, and LSD; attended conferences, lectured, and wrote about the psychedelic experience; avidly followed the results of medical experimentation, even suggested some routes himself in his lengthy correspondence on the subject—judging by his letters it was the major preoccupation of the last ten years of his life.

Mescaline was the threshold to his expanding interest in parapsychology, Eastern mysticism and, as he reports, a vision of "the living, primordial cosmic fact of Love." Much talk of Nirvana, Atman, Brahman—"I remain an agnostic who aspires to be a gnostic," Huxley wrote a year before he died, "but a gnostic only on the mystical level, a gnostic without symbols, cosmologies or a pantheon."

His foray into hallucinogens and spiritualism may seem a startling culmination to this rationalist life, yet not so paradoxical after all. For Huxley was not tripping out but investigating (he was always remarkably clinical about his drug experiences). It was not transcendence he was after so much as insight: the mind itself is what he was seeking. The power of chemistry to induce a radical mental state, he believed, could provide the testing ground for a new theory of

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knowledge and perception. Even mysticism was part of the experiment: "As for the guide line for persons taking mescaline or LSD_{25}," he wrote to Dr. Humphry Osmond, his closest correspondent during his last years, "I think the best way of doing the job would be to ask a series of questions"—

> For example, "Do you now understand what Blake meant when he said, 'Gratitude is heaven itself'?" "Eckhart defined God in operational terms as, 'The denial of all denials.' What is your feeling about this?" . . . "Samsara and Nirvana are one—the Absolute is present in every relative and particular event. Eternity manifests itself in every moment of time. How do you feel about these paradoxes?" . . . It would be possible to put together several dozens of such short questions and statements, to be submitted to the subject in the course of his experience. If he set his mind to them, they might act as Zen koans and cause sudden openings into hitherto unglimpsed regions. It is certainly worth trying. If you think this approach is sound, I will go ahead with the plan.

"In the future," he had written to Henry Miller in 1945, "men of science may live down their current prejudice against psychic phenomena and [realize] the power to be gained by acquiring 'gratuitous graces.'" Scientific analyst and cultural visionary—another limbo perhaps—but Huxley had finally found his vocation. □

'I' Poems and 'You' Poems

EARTH WALK: New and Selected Poems. *By William Meredith. Alfred A. Knopf. 94 pp. $4.50. Paper $1.95.*

TESTAMENT FOR MY STUDENTS: And Other Poems. *By Kay Boyle. Doubleday & Co. 90 pp. $4.95. Paper $1.95.*

ROBERTS W. FRENCH
Mr. French is associate editor of The Massachusetts Review. *He is editing the letters of Rolfe Humphries.*

The two books stand uneasily on my shelf together. What do they have in common? Both are collections ranging over more than a quarter of a century; other than that, they are significantly different in every way that matters. While each book has something to say to the other, it is difficult to imagine where they would meet.

The distance between them might have been guessed from the photographs on the dust covers. Kay Boyle (extreme left) appears with students and colleagues in a crowd facing two large and helmeted policemen; she is carrying a sign on which the word "STRIKE" may be discerned. Meredith, on the other hand, appears in isolation; wearing coat and tie, he looks out at us from a gray background, stern and unruffled. The two photographs turn out to be remarkably accurate indicators of the differences between the two books.

To make the large distinction first, it could be said that Meredith is essentially a private poet, and Kay Boyle, especially in her later poems, a public poet. Meredith's book must be one of the few published these days in which there is no mention of Vietnam, of racial conflict, of Johnson or Nixon, or of students (a curious omission, considering that the author has taught in universities for most of his life). To mention these absent subjects is, of course, neither to praise nor blame, but only to define. Some poets are concerned with inner, some with outer, weather, and Meredith —like the poet who has most influenced him, Robert Frost—is a poet of the first kind. Reading through his book, one learns that he fought in a war (but how distant that war now seems, and how dated the poems), and that a submarine named the *Thresher* was lost at sea on April 10, 1965; but these are the only direct contacts one has with the public events of the times.

In general, Meredith finds his poems in the small experiences of living; it is the poems that make the occasion, and not the other way around. Thus one finds in the collection, for example, a moonlight meditation on death, a poem about waking up in the morning, a poem about opera, a poem on "Falling Asleep to Birdsong," a poem called "Sunrise with Crows," a poem about ballet, and a poem on roots. Nothing great here, except as the poet makes it so; and clearly he intends to make it so; above the clamor, he seeks the quiet place where the eternal verities may be found. In the temporal, Meredith looks for the timeless.

Kay Boyle, on the other hand, is immersed in the moment. Reading through her recent poems, one learns of students beaten by police, of children burned in Vietnam, of Black Power, of the persecution of the Jews, of the murder of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. The earlier poems are not so

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topical but, like many of her colleagues, Miss Boyle has been drawn into the front ranks. Her sympathies are clear: she is with the students, the blacks, the suffering Vietnamese, "the outcast, the hungry, the condemned." It is with such as these that she talks in her poems, and for such that the poems were written.

Meredith writes "I" poems, while Kay Boyle writes "you" poems. Throughout *Earth Walk* one hears, or overhears, someone pondering, placing, remembering himself:

At the edge of the town I grow old . . .
When I was young I looked high and low for a father . . .
The acts of my life swarm down the street like Puerto Rican kids . . .
I stand on the ledge where rock runs into the river . . .
It is night. I am a thousand miles from home.

For Kay Boyle the dominant movement has been outward rather than inward. Seldom does she appear in isolation, for most of her poems reveal a speaker establishing relationship with someone else. Significantly, seventeen of the twenty-eight poems in her book are poems either "to" or "for" someone, and most of them speak directly to another person:

Each year you came jogging or loping down that hall . . .
You said it all, everything,
A long time before anyone else knew
How to say it.
Your sentences cast print and paper to the winds . . .
I wish you triumphs that are yours already . . .
I offer you a heart of red isinglass outlined in tinsel.

Characteristically, Kay Boyle's poems develop out of responses to the words or deeds of the person addressed, and one senses behind them the generating force of an urgent moral and emotional compulsion.

Meredith's poems suggest rather different origins. The title poem is instructive. "Earth Walk" must create its own occasion, for the incident it describes is without apparent significance. Driving to the hospital one day, the poet decides to pull off the road:

Now I unstrap the rented Avis car and, opening the hatch, step boldly out onto the Planet Earth. My skull is bare,
thin animal hide is fitted to my feet.
The autumn air is fresh, a first pepperidge tree
has turned mahogany and red. This is a safe walk.
This turnpike is uninhabited. When I come back
I'll meet a trooper with a soft, wide hat who will take away my Earth-rocks and debrief me.

What does it add up to? Very little, really; the pleasure is in watching the fiction work itself out. Indeed, what interests us in Meredith's poems is likely to be the *poetry*—the resources of language—rather than the subject. As Meredith has himself said in an introduction to Shelley, "The discoveries of a lyric poet which chiefly interest us are those concerning language and imagery." Meredith, certainly, is concerned with the techniques of poetry to a far greater extent than Kay Boyle; what interests us in *her* poetry is likely to be the subject. Consequently, Meredith's poems need to be sustained by style in a way that hers do not, at least not her recent ones.

"If any cry means to live," Meredith has said in a poem omitted from this collection, "it must be an uncommon one." Accordingly, he delights in the technical challenge, for mastery of technique is one way (but not the only way) to produce uncommon cries. Included in his book are such technical feats as a sestina, a poem patterned after George Herbert's "Vertue," a poem in *In Memoriam* stanzas, a sonnet built on identical rhymes, a number of poems in various forms of rhymed and slant-rhymed quatrains, and a poem that attempts to duplicate the difficult stanzaic patterns of Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening" (only to crash into inevitable defeat with the final rhymes of "trees," "breeze" and "enemies").

Kay Boyle is not much interested in such refinements. Although her book contains poems dating back to 1925, there is not a rhymed poem in it. In general, her poems are written in long, variable lines that threaten to break into prose, and sometimes do; but, as Eliot said in "East Coker," the poetry does not matter. Miss Boyle's title poem, for example, is aptly titled "Testament for my Students" rather than, say, "Poem for my Students," since the idea of a *testament*—a statement of belief—is more important than the idea of a *poem*. The point of the thing is praise, and the objects of praise are the students, "sweet emissaries from Arizona/Montana, Illinois, Mass.," beautiful, fragile, perched precariously upon the times:

At your temples pools of blood always trembled
And I would see them spill.

"You were not afraid of death," Miss Boyle tells her students, and she has seen them beaten down, gassed, clubbed.


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And only they can answer her question:

What good were the poets to you then, Baudelaire, Whitman
Rimbaud, Poe? "All the good in the world!" you shouted out
Through the blood in your mouths. They were there beside you on
The campus grass, Shakespeare, Rilke, Bronte, Radiguet
Yeats, Apollinaire, their fingers on the pulse in your wrists
Their young arms cradling your bones.

It would be surprising to find Meredith placing poetry in this sort of social context; even his fine poem on the wreck of the *Thresher* turns away from such commitment:

Whether we give assent to this or rage
Is a question of temperament and does not matter.

Can we, today, be quite so sure that it does not matter? The statement is the kind that frequently puts Meredith in trouble. Like Frost, he sometimes says too much, points too obviously, and lapses into easy generalizations like "Life is some kind of loathsome hag/Who is forever threatening to turn beautiful," or "Is there any plummet or flight as sheer as the fledgling's?" or "To be of our own nature is what it means *to be kind*," or "A life should be all gathering and art." Is that all there is? we ask, and the self-imposed limitations of the poem force us to say, reluctantly, Yes. At his worst, we hear the voice of the lecturer all too clearly.

But a poet's failures are closely allied with his successes. At his best, Meredith can revive the great commonplaces in subtle harmonies and make the poem appear almost a remembrance, as Keats said it should. Kay Boyle, as we might expect, succeeds in rather different ways; at her best, she awakens us not to memory, but to realization of that which is before our eyes. One tells us what we are, the other tells us where we are. □

The Inglorious Revolution

THE COURT AND THE COUNTRY: The Beginning of the English Revolution. *By Perez Zagorin. Atheneum Publishers. 366 pp. $10.*

CHRISTOPHER HILL
Mr. Hill is Master of Balliol College, Oxford. His latest book, God's Englishman, *a study of Oliver Cromwell, will be published this summer by Dial Press.*

Somewhere about the 1860s a great historian, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, invented the concept of "the Puritan Revolution." The 17th-century English Revolution, according to Gardiner, had been about religious and constitutional issues: it was not a class struggle. This interpretation dominated the English-speaking world for two generations until the publication of R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926) and the English translation of Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930), each in its very different ways suggesting connections between Puritanism and the needs of nascent capitalism. The idea derived ultimately from Marx, and in the 1930s even the most insular of British and American historians became aware of the work of continental historians operating in the same tradition.

By 1941 Professor Tawney seemed to have established a new orthodoxy, a sociological interpretation of the English Revolution. Even when his views were attacked, no one proposed to revert to "the Puritan Revolution." All participants in the controversy which followed discussed the origins of the revolution primarily in economic and social terms. Professor Trevor-Roper saw the civil war as a battle between Court and Country, Ins and Outs, and thought the declining gentry were the driving force on the parliamentary side. A bout of sharp infighting revealed that both schools were better at shooting down their opponents' models than at producing a satisfactory alternative. Statistics were lacking on both sides. Since then a lot of detailed research has been done, and the time is ripe for a new synthesis. I turned eagerly to Professor Zagorin's book in the hope that he had produced it.

Zagorin's proclaimed object is "to penetrate the specific factors, political, social and religious, that engendered the revolt against Charles I." Narrative, he claims, is subordinate to this aim. So far as I am concerned, however, the narrative parts of this book are much the most stimulating. In the best tradition of S. R. Gardiner and C. V. Wedgwood, the generalizations are implied in the way the story is told; and Zagorin has many new and interesting facts to relate on the way.

His description of nonconformity in the church before Laud's advent to power, and of the disastrous results of Laud's innovations, is excellent. So is the account of the undercover links and activities of the opposition in the 1630s, and the account of "the citizen element," with its careful recognition that "the political stand of the urban segment of the society was, in fact, by no means uniform." Zagorin rightly distinguishes between ruling oligarchies, which needed government protection, and the mass of rank-and-file citizens who came to resent government policies. This adds force to his account of the *coup d'état* in London in December 1641, by which the Parliamentarians snatched control of the city from the Royalist ruling clique. Zagorin has read widely in the sources and has an eye—again like Gardiner and Miss Wedgwood—for the telling quotation.

But he is less successful at saying anything new about the causes of the revolution. Like Gardiner, he denies that the civil war was a class conflict, emphasizing constitutional and religious issues; like Gardiner he leaves us with no very clear idea why the two sides lined up as they did in 1642. He uses Trevor-Roper's concept of a conflict between Court and Country in discussing the years before 1640; but he shows (as others have done before him) that this model cannot explain the division between Parliamentarians and Cavaliers in 1642. It is helpful to have this clearly stated; but we are left wondering what the use of the model is.

Trevor-Roper's version purported to provide a sociological explanation of the origins of the civil war. It had the drawback that it did not fit the facts. Zagorin's model fits them better, but offers no sociological explanation. "The Court," so far from being a sociological or even geographical category, turns out to be a state of mind. For "the Country," as Zagorin honestly reveals, "received support from many who held offices"; and "not all attached to the Court were deeply or unalterably committed to it." Nor is this a matter of a few individuals or of "the intermediate ranks of the royal service" only: peers and privy councilors "abetted" or even "belonged to" the Country. "The weaker faction in court did strive always to pull down the stronger by a Parliament," the Duke of Newcastle reminded Charles II.

"The Country" is no more capable of precision. It covers dismissed courtiers, potential courtiers who, for reasons of political, religious or other conviction, withdrew from, or refused to take their natural place at the Court; and it covers the vast mass of backwoods gentry, most of whom were to be Royalists in the civil war. "The Country" means nothing more precise to Professor Zagorin than it did to Gardiner a century ago. Is it any more useful than rejected "economic abstractions" like "rising gentry," "de-

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clining gentry" or "progressive landlords"?

Professor Zagorin tells us that "the conflict between the Court and the Country was . . . not rooted in social or economic contradictions. Fundamentally, it expressed a *political* opposition among the governing and wealthy members of the society." But, in what appears to be a dubious oversimplification, Zagorin claims that this political opposition "produced no original political doctrine."

To use the Court/Country antithesis, given the slightly pejorative flavor of "courtier" and the more favorable patriotic overtones of "Country" is of course to repeat the political mythology of the Parliamentarians. This is harmless provided we know what we are doing, and how much ignorance the words conceal. My prejudices, like those of Professor Zagorin, lead me to presume that contemporaries understood their society better than 20th-century historians imposing their own sociological patterns. I admire his use of literary evidence to elucidate what contemporaries thought. But we must exercise discretion here. To make distinctions "because the society itself did so," is the beginning but surely not the end of wisdom. "The society" often fails to notice what is happening, wishes to pretend it is not happening or to stop it happening.

However, the one point at which Professor Zagorin vehemently rejects contemporary evidence is illuminating. The Earl of Clarendon "was guilty of gross misrepresentation" for "conveying the impression that the Parliamentarians' resistance was an outbreak of social insubordination." The warmth of the language—Professor Zagorin is normally equable and urbane—arouses our interest. What had Clarendon done? He had supplied the evidence which wicked Marxist historians (like myself) have used in suggesting that class divisions underlay the civil war.

"The civil war *in its beginning* was no revolt of the inferior orders," writes Professor Zagorin (my italics), and the Parliamentarian leaders wished for no such outcome: a remark which could be made equally well of the beginnings of the American, French and Russian Revolutions. Professor Zagorin's indignation reminds one of Sir Charles Firth's complaint that Clarendon's *History* "has the fundamental defect, that it is a history of a religious revolution in which the religious element is omitted." A historian who knows in advance that the English Revolution was about religion, or was not about class, naturally feels let down by Clarendon. This solid, impeccably conservative participant in the revolution, so well-informed, so centrally placed, so judicious, cannot be laughed off so easily as Baxter, Dugdale, Hobbes, May, Warwick, Winstanley and a host of others whom Professor Zagorin does not bother to refute or even rebuke.

I should perhaps have begun this review by declaring an interest. Professor Zagorin complains of historians, including myself, who use the French Revolution as a model with which to compare and contrast the English Revolution, though he recognizes them both as "great revolutions . . . fittingly linked." He states, and I agree, that it is wrong to believe that "a single morphological structure exists to which the explanation of events of a certain kind must necessarily conform." But he sometimes seems himself to use the Russian Revolution as a yardstick. Otherwise why insist on "the conscious, unremitting will to transform fundamentally the condition of humanity" as a necessary part of the concept of revolution?

Professor Zagorin easily shows that there was no such will among those who made the English Revolution of 1640-41. They did not even use the word "revolution" in exactly our sense. "Is it not therefore apparent," he asks, "that a revolution initiated by men who had no thought of what *we* have come to understand by 'revolution' and, moreover, no awareness of being revolutionaries, must present, in significant respects, another character than the type of revolutionary change predominant in aftertimes?" This consideration, however, surely applies to the originators of the American, French and indeed February Revolutions—even though all these had earlier experiences to draw on. Here too men "groped blindly toward the new, instead of boldly embracing it"; and "set forth on a revolutionary path whose consequences [they] were far from perceiving."

We must not confuse words with things. Men can perform actions without knowing the names by which later generations will describe them. "It is," Professor Zagorin rightly says, "a universal characteristic of revolutions that their course can neither be predicted nor controlled." Before 1640 the adherents of the Country opposition "were unconsciously shaping a different conception of the polity—one that gave the power of decision over policy to parliament, rather than the King." "Revolution is never a sudden birth": Professor Zagorin shows how inexorably events drove the Long Parliament's leaders along a revolutionary path which they had not chosen. Much of the analysis, *mutatis*


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mutandis, could be transferred to 1789 or early 1917. There were, moreover, sound political and social reasons for the refusal of ruling-class Englishmen in the later 17th and 18th centuries to look back with any pleasure to the events of 1640-60: 1688 seemed to them a much more desirable sort of "revolution" because it had been accompanied by a minimum of social disorder.

If in this review points of criticism predominate, this will no doubt be ascribed to *odium theologicum* on my part. I would myself attribute it to disappointment that a historian who dismisses his predecessors with such promising brusqueness (Elton, "wrong"; Curtis and Walzer, "anachronistic"; Laslett, "confusing") has not himself squared the circle. We would all like someone to "penetrate the specific factors . . . that engendered the revolt against Charles I and determined its character and progress." But this book, full though it is of admirable details, does not realize its more ambitious claims. □

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

To every age its Superman. The young are piling into *Getting Straight*, and what they're getting is the news that if everyone would do what Harry (Elliott Gould) tells them to do, the torments of race, war, violence and commercial exploitation would drop from their limbs and they could walk together once more through the sheltering glades of Eden. Or words to that effect.

Harry is very much brighter than anyone else in the picture (a superiority made easier by the fact that everyone else is very stupid, singularly ill-informed, or high on drugs), and he has served a term in Vietnam, which earns him the right to stand in for god. It is not, however, the God of the Testaments but one of the Olympians, much given to fornication and subject to mutilation by his devotees. His car repeatedly bursts into explosive flames, and he emerges unscathed from the reek, which I took to be an effective bit of supernatural business.

This personage with the soup-strainer mustache, wild eyes and large, ill-coordinated body has materialized at a West Coast university identified as being not Berkeley, where he is completing his graduate studies in the School of Education. Harry is of the opinion that black nationalism is a form of ostentation, that students get a sexy bang out of tangling with the police, and that the most beautiful work a man can do is bring the light of understanding to the functional illiterate (exemplified by his success in guiding a Mexican-American football player from a preoccupation with comics to an admiration for *Don Quixote*). These propositions are not uniformly self-evident, but Harry is not a man much given to argument; his method is to wave his arms and shout insults.

Nor does he prosper as a scholar. He is thrown out of the School of Education for having allowed a dope-addled friend (Robert Lyons) to take an exam for him; he could, of course, have passed it readily enough, but the hour conflicted with the class he was giving for nonreading undergraduates. And he is deprived of his graduate degree in English when, becoming incensed by a whey-faced professor who tries to force him to agree that *The Great Gatsby* was Fitzgerald's confession of homosexual torments, he leaps upon the conference table in a Dionysian frenzy and flings the contents of their attaché cases into the faces of the dumbfounded examiners. After this interlude, a really fine old professor who appreciates Harry asks him what he now intends to do. This gives Harry the chance to answer that it is not what you do but what you are that matters—a remark that made me wonder whether Elbert Hubbard was staging a comeback in California. What Harry is doing as the picture closes is copulate with his number-one girl (Candice Bergen) behind a balustrade that is the momentary focal point of a tear-gas and billy-club melee between blood-streaming students and riot-visored police. Harry demonstrates his generalizations.

Getting Straight is a production of Columbia Pictures, and Columbia Pictures approaches its subject—which is dissent in America—in the way that the mass media can be counted upon to approach controversy. It lays the facts right on the fence. There are some mighty decent, understanding people among the older generation (and, of course, some fearful creeps); the young are beautiful and splendidly idealistic, but willful, meagerly informed and hedonistic; the police are woefully incapable of restraining themselves, but a certain element among the protesters drives them wild with provocative taunts and dirty words. If both sides would lower their voices, they could hear Harry, the divinely reasonable man, and come to realize that the country is seized by a passion of misunderstanding, not by a crisis of values. But since they will scream and fling themselves about, the ensuing scenes of mayhem and lust provide exciting footage, and it is the duty of the communications network to tell it like it is. I kept hearing the applause from our Vice President and the wife of our Attorney General.

Early in the film, a pair of boys, one black and one white, join up with two girls, also black and white. Whereupon the white boy puts his arm around the black girl, and the black boy puts his around the white girl, and the picture's level of awareness is neatly established. From there on the stereotypes proliferate: the dope taker wears steel-rimmed glasses, a weak stubble of beard and says "like, man" in a far-off voice; Harry's girl friend is driving herself into a nervous catastrophe from a conflict between the new permissiveness and a desire for *Woman's Day* amenities; his black girl is a glorious animal who compliments him on his prowess (for a white boy, that is) and solicits from him a reading list in the contemporary novel between couplings; the black militant is a smiling rabble-rouser; the university president is at once a troubled liberal and a spastic bureaucrat. There are indeed two sides to every question, but in this case what question? Columbia sayeth not.

The young, as noted, pile in to see *Getting Straight*. Perhaps Elliott Gould gives them some hope, perhaps some dream of glory. If so, it is a mean deception: Harry (played by Gould with formidable charm and a lot more intelligence than the script makes valid) is not a character; he is packaged social concern. But perhaps the young go to the picture to marvel at the ability of a really with-it studio to commercialize their trauma. That's what I hope. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

Sixteenth-century France produced two great writers: Rabelais and Montaigne. Both were Renaissance humanists. Rabelais, cleric and libertarian, exulted in the pleasure of living—brain, blood, mouth and gut, flesh and genitals. (In Montaigne, Rabelais' ebullience is becalmed in measured wisdom.) Rabelais enriched the French language through his steaming imagination, his all-encompassing gusto. Rhetoric and thought in him were of the same substance: he invented a world.

Jean-Louis Barrault, a Rabelaisian of

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the head, using segments of Rabelais' prose, has concocted a stage festivity out of the stories of their joyous monsters. In Paris after the student uprisings of May 1968, Barrault's essay in "total theatre" struck its audience as a gorgeous gesture of defiance. It was a quasi-political as well as a theatrical triumph.

Rabelais (recently at the City Center) was designed to be played circus fashion, in the round, in a moderate-sized house. The City Center auditorium is much too large and its proscenium stage altogether unsuited to the planned effects. The actors shout but their voices ascend to the flies, and when they turn their backs to the audience (a few of whom sit in the rear of the platform) the words become totally unintelligible to the audience out front.

But even that is not the worst of it. The production does not embody Rabelais' giganticism. Its style, unusual in Paris, has been made familiar in other European capitals and, to some extent, here. The actors sing, dance, clown, cavort and riot in a manner which in no way turns us on. We have seen all this better done by other companies—especially by our various dance ensembles. Barrault's "choreography" may startle and delight the French because his theatre is associated with the serious, if not the solemn. But for all the frisking about, his *Rabelais* is juiceless and joyless.

Barrault's importance is national. After the war he enlivened the languishing French theatre by employing fine artists to design his settings, by offering an adaptation of *The Castle* and having made a new translation of *Hamlet*, by reviving Feydeau, by encouraging Camus as a playwright, by engaging likable and sometimes first-rate actors in permanent association.

But Barrault's talent is not strikingly original. He is an intelligent and assiduous eclectic, a limited actor and pantomimist. He is no Copeau, Reinhardt, Meyerhold, Brecht or Grotowski. There are lesser men than these in England, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, who are his superiors in innovation and skill. The best production of Barrault's theatre was that of Molière's *Les Fourberies de Scapin* which was directed by Jouvet.

The Me Nobody Knows (Orpheum Theatre, 126 Second Avenue) is based on a series of tiny "compositions," edited by Stephen M. Joseph, written by children between the ages of 7 and 18, attending public schools in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Harlem, Jamaica, Manhattan and the Youth House in the Bronx—in other words, children of our various ghettos. Some of the kids' poems are used as lyrics, and there are others in a more adult vein by Will Holt and Herb Schapiro with well-orchestrated music by Gary William Friedman.

It is not a "rock musical." It is a staging of the assembled material. The various numbers move smoothly from one to another creating a sense of unity in an architectural setting suggestive of a tenement with projections of children's drawings in the background, all admirably arranged and lit by Clarke Dunham. Patricia Birch has done a good job staging the musical numbers; the whole is under the excellent supervision of Robert H. Livingston.

Ghettos are wretched places; their existence is a shameful blight on our civilization. Knowing this, some may complain that making an evening's entertainment on such premises is a reprehensible exploitation of misery. I can understand the objection, but I am not sure that it is valid.

I myself was born in a ghetto: the lower East Side of Manhattan, and although I witnessed suffering, cruelty, crime and poverty there (albeit different in kind from what now exists) and my father, a doctor, was called upon to heal many of the ill, the wounded, the disabled, I also saw signs of energy, resistance, robust hope and, miraculously, a great deal of fun, a keen joy in living rendered all the more exhilarating by the surrounding squalor. Some of my fondest memories are those of my early years in that "depressed area."

Enjoyment of *The Me Nobody Knows* does not preclude understanding the situation in our ghettos or imply complacency about the need to eradicate it. What I cherished in the show is the talent and vitality of the cast, the bubble of its playfulness, the raciness of its expression which, with or without the advantages of privileged training among the actors, is still the produce of the streets in the dim and sequestered quarters of our town. If I liked the jubilantly aggressive college dropouts of the South in *Stomp* (as I did), there is no reason why I should reject the jaunty youngsters whose laments and frolics are "romanticized" in *The Me Nobody Knows*. The fact is that I had a good time—though I found it a bit too long. The entire company pleased me.

Designed to provoke careless laughter, John Murray and Allen Boretz's *Room Service* (Edison Theatre, 240 West 47 Street) is a play of the late thirties about three young men,

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thoroughly broke, who have set out to produce a Broadway show on less than a shoestring.

It is good fun, especially if you remember that the circumstances are true to the facts as well as the legend of the depression days; while its plot is extravagant, it maintains a modicum of credibility as all good farce must.

Its present revival, under the direction of Harold Stone, is done for all it's worth in slapstick fashion. Sight gags abound, physical humor and a mad pace prevail, the whole verging on burlesque. Plausible objections have been made to this treatment, but perhaps it was the only way to put the show over at this particular time. Given the director's (and possibly the players') choice of style, most of the acting is good and some of the cutting up is hilarious. Nearly all the performances have attributes of "legitimacy," but Ron Leibman's maniacal tension in the leading role makes him, for all his technical brilliance, less likable than the other zanies in the charade. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

The sculptures of George Segal are not cast from life in the usual sense that the material takes the direct impression of head or body. On the other hand, these sculptures do depend on the real bodily presence of the sitters, whom Segal wraps in bandages soaked in wet plaster. The sitters are protected by a layer of burlap or plastic as the chill dead weight of the impregnated material presses on them, absorbing the contours and posture of the enwrapped figures. Each separate section is cut off when it has hardened and joined ultimately with others to form the lunar crust of Segal's plasters.

What you see when you look at a Segal, then, is not a life cast but a skin, bearing on its buried interior surface the negative impression from which a conventional life cast would have been made. The exterior surface flows continuously in a way that recalls his origins as a painter; the plaster is, so to say, like a curving, folded painting, with comparatively little opening up or penetrating of the solid volumes. Spatial drama, where it occurs, is achieved by the sudden lifting of the whole figure, on a scaffolding or a ladder, or dropping it to the floor, in sleep or stupor.

The work process, as it blunts specific detail and muffles individual personality, performs an essentializing function, converting the documentary human traces into resonant images of humanity. Segal is one of the few figurative artists of this time who can generalize without becoming sentimental or gross. His figures have an expressive clumsiness, a kind of dumb concreteness that is stressed by their build—thick rather than athletic—as well as by their Frankenstein's monster feet. (The monster, as defined in early movies, was touching in its approximation to human bearing.)

In the catalogue of the exhibition at the Sidney Janis Gallery in April, a work called "The Artist in his Loft" is described as consisting of "plaster, wood, glass, porcelain, metal." A plaster figure is shaving before a circular mirror framed by washbasin, cupboards, shelves and heater, simulating the corner of a room. There is a distinction here that the mere listing of constituent elements does not show. Segal makes and models plaster, but assembles the hardware with far less processing; the objects are found, fitted together. Handmade plasters are corporeal presences in an ambiance defined by ready-made objects.

The generalized humanity of Segal's figures is based, I think, partly on the bulky figures' aspiration to action and partly on Segal's ability to take hold of human gesture at its most representative moment in typical situations. His figures constitute, in a way, an anthology of ergonomic gesture. (Ergonomics is the study of the relationship between men and machines, but *machines* must be understood to include furniture, work space and all territories of human use.) Segal's early sculptures were of figures at table, a bus driver behind the wheel, a man on a bicycle, a man leaning on a pinball machine—all situations in which figures and hardware are joined. The plaster figures in real chairs and beds or on the stairs and in doorways show clearly Segal's care for the way people occupy a space shared with objects. Space, here, is not the abstraction of 1950s art criticism, but the area of human reach. Segal's eye for stance and gesture enable him to reconnoiter the "infinity of gestures and attitudes" that men make, to quote the artist, and to locate those with a typical significance. He has a shrewd sense of occupational poses (how to drive, how to climb a ladder) and of the typical kinds of rapport between the body and objects in walking, standing, sitting, lying.

When he is dealing with more than single objects, such as a chair, a ladder, a mirror, there is a risk that the objects will become a scenic setting for Expressionistic waxworks. Segal defends himself from this by a severely schematic use of real objects. Since 1965, the year of "The Butcher Shop" and "Old Woman at a Window," his décor has been as artificial in its reality as the *mise en scène* of a late Godard movie. Segal has said, "My pieces often don't end at their physical boundaries." An example in the recent show is "Girl Looking into Mirror"; she stands on the floor, on the same plane as the spectator, and the mirror, on the real wall of the gallery, includes oneself as well as the girl's white reflection. "The Store Window" (a girl in a doorway is the depicted situation) is lit by two bright fluorescent tubes; the light source is contained within the sculpture, but radiates to illumine the spectator's space as well. Segal's ability to combine this expansive environmental space with the definition of compact figures is extraordinary. Body image and environmental space are convincingly united.

In the ten years he has been working in this style, Segal has been dealing with whole forms, the same size as life (plus an inch or two), uninterrupted by the demands of composition. Formal control is in terms of the location of figures among objects and their distance from the spectator. Beautiful works in this mode in the recent show were "Girl Looking into Mirror," "Man on a Ladder" and "The Store Window." Parallel to the sculpture, however, Segal has made many pastels in which anatomies are cut and cropped with a doctrinaire post-Degas abruptness. Unexpectedly, he has transferred this tight fragmentation to sculpture in a group of shallow boxes, all 5 feet high and 2 feet wide, into which he has forced a bit of a red table, a bit of a blue chair, and slices of figures in relief. This sudden move into ostentatious tension and dense composition results in very awkward works whose experimental status was made even more obvious by their hanging in the gallery at a slanting angle off the wall. □

WHERE I AM NOW

Every morning I look
Into the world
And there is no renewal.
Every night, my lids clamped,
I concentrate
On the renewal to come.

I am on the lookout for
A great illumining,
Prepared to recognize it
Instantly and put it to use,
Even among the desks
And chairs of the office, should
It come between nine and five.

Harvey Shapiro

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1349

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 and 28. But they weren't necessarily offhand in the way they put their feet together. (8,5)
5 See 1 down.
10 A little something for breakfast? (5)
11 Happy to have an oil change, but objectively we make something of a bloomer. (9)
12 Incog, he sounds coming back this way. (7)
13 The habits of an actor should be familiar to one, unless it's in your bedroom. (7)
14 Teased or shaggy? (6)
15 Recently but no longer operated as a high church residence? (7)
18 In the proverb ideally suited to what a player might sometimes do with a weak heart. (7)
21 The thing life-savers have come to! (6)
24 What enabled Mercury to get around so fast? (7)
26 Such an animal might be spotted anyplace. (7)
27 Lent spice, for a change, to the irritable type. (9)
29 Not necessarily what Hamlet noticed in Denmark to prompt his observation.
30 Tired? Run from the party, when present but uninvited. (8)

DOWN

1 and 5 across Israelites or Koreans? (6,6)
2 Condescend to do what the umpire might at first. (9)
3 General call, looking somewhat suggestive. (7)
4 In conclusion, the challenge is brought into conflict. (7)
6 Part of the psyche in case of the obvious. (7)
7 North or south from Warsaw, perhaps. (5)
8 Though a poor sinner he is put in a sacred spot. (8)
9 It sounds as though you should be able to get hold of this musician easily! (6)
16 Do unheard of reconstruction for the opponent of 1 across. (9)
17 Calls in question. (8)
19 Possessing the characteristics of melancholy, melodramatic energy, etc. (7)
20 Preliminary designs for levies? (6)
21 How to get a polished image of famous point of decision? (7)
22 Implying one who makes an error should go on foot. (7)
23 A hot spring might be the basis for it. (6)
25 Town? The French should be about sick of it! (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1348

ACROSS: 1 Merit badges; 9 Gigantic; 10 Copper; 11 Baboons; 12 Tiny Tim; 14 Relate; 15 Ovenbird; 17 Strength; 20 Factor; 22 Barbary; 26 Virago; 27 Identity; 28 Adventurers. DOWN: 2 Elaborate; 3 Intense; 4, 13, 24 and 23 Back to the drawing board; 5 Decline; 6 Empty; 7 Pirate; 8 Metier; 16 Backwater; 18 Tragic; 19 Garrote; 20 Forbear; 21 Ornate; 25 List.

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

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